Crises, Creep, and the Surveillance State
Michal Lavi*
COVID-19 started in December 2019 in China and spread rapidly and
globally. This virus led to a public health emergency of international concern
as a threat to the public’s health and safety.
The speed of virus infections depended on various aspects of an
individual’s social network position. Individuals with more friends, or those
who were more central in the network, caught the virus sooner. In the beginning
of the outbreak, governments thought that tracking human networks and
collecting information on the movements of individuals would allow
governments to utilize the information for mitigating the spread of the virus.
They believed that mass surveillance would help health authorities identify the
contacts an infected person had and warn such contacts, thus reducing the
likelihood for them to infect others. By gaining such data, governments believed
they could focus their efforts to block the spread of the virus and even predict
where the next cluster of infections would emerge.
In general, information and data-driven models have the potential to
promote health. Data is knowledge; however, knowledge is power that can grant
governments control over citizens, leading to a slippery slope that could creep
beyond health considerations and undermine the infrastructure of civil rights.
The result could be constant surveillance instead of privacy, self-censorship
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instead of freedom of expression, suspicion instead of trust, and the rise of the
surveillance state instead of democracy.
This Article outlines a taxonomy of surveillance data-driven practices that
were used to combat the virus. It describes the potential benefits of such models
while addressing the dangers created by such mass surveillance. Additionally,
this Article demonstrates that surveillance practices can compromise privacy,
infringe on free expression and equality without safeguards or due process, and
lead to abuse of power. Finally, it establishes how such practices can erode
democracy and creep beyond combating a virus.
This Article argues that even in times of crisis, we can have both health
and human rights. It warns against surveillance creep and advocates for a
privacy-by-design approach in such models, including anonymization of
personal information. This Article further proposes safeguards including
transparency, impact assessments of data protections and algorithms, fiduciary
duties, oversight, and due process. Finally, this Article addresses practices of
long-term invasive surveillance that should be ruled out altogether and rejected
at all costs. COVID-19 is a test case that demonstrates the consequences of mass
surveillance without warrants or adequate regulatory prerequisites, and the
misuse of personal data. Thus, this Article warns that the creep of mass
surveillance can lead to the rise of the surveillance state.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“We must be vigilant about our community’s health—and rights as
well.” 1
The COVID-19 virus that began in December 2019 spread rapidly
worldwide.2 This virus led to a global health emergency as it infected
1
Kari Bode, COVID-19 Could Provide Cover for Domestic Surveillance Expansion, VICE:
MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 16, 2020, 7:15 PM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/884ew5
/covid-19-could-provide-cover-for-domestic-surveillance-expansion
(quoting
Telephone Interview with Gaurav Laroia, Senior Policy Counsel and Privacy Expert,
Free Press).
2
Khadijah Abid et al., Progress of COVID-19 Epidemic in Pakistan, 32 ASIA PAC. J. PUB.
HEALTH 154, 154 (2020) (“The outbreak of coronavirus initiated as pneumonia of
unknown cause in December 2019 in Wuhan, China, which has been now spreading
rapidly out of Wuhan to other countries.”).
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millions of people, burdened healthcare facilities,3 and governments
perceived it as a threat to public health and safety.4 Humankind faced
a global crisis, as the steps taken to combat the virus affected every
aspect of life. International borders closed, schools and universities
shut down, governments prohibited public gatherings, airlines
abolished flights, and economies crashed.5 The approaches taken to
combat the virus will likely influence healthcare systems, economies,
and our cultures for years to come.6
Several governments and private companies used practices of
mass collection of data,7 as well as “health-system-supportive
technology solutions, including smartphone apps and other digital
tools.”8 “The proliferation of smart devices and the development in
digital communication has led to sophisticated methods” of
surveillance, gathering location data, and other health-related data.9
Governments believed this data would allow them to target those who
were suspected of having caught the virus and monitor adherence to

See Alfonso J. Rodriguez-Morales et al., Clinical, Laboratory and Imaging Features of
COVID-19: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 34 TRAVEL MED. & INFECTIOUS DISEASE
1–2 (2020).
4
The World Health Organization (WHO) announced the virus to be a pandemic.
See Philippa Roxby, Coronavirus Confirmed as a Pandemic by World Health Organization,
BBC: WORLD (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-51839944.
Additionally, the United States declared it a state of emergency. Charlie Savage, Trump
Declared an Emergency Over Coronavirus. Here’s What It Can Do, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/13/us/politics/coronavirus-nationalemergency.html; Toni M. Massaro et al., Pandemics and the Constitution, 2022 U. ILL. L.
REV. 229, 230 (2022).
5
See Adam Chilton et al., Support for Restricting Liberty for Safety: Evidence During the
COVID-19 Pandemic from the United States, Japan, and Israel; Hadar Y. Jabotinsky & Roee
Sarel, How Crisis Affects Crypto: Coronavirus as a Test Case, 74 HASTINGS L.J. 2–3
(forthcoming 2023), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3557929.
6
See Yuval Noah Harari, The World After Coronavirus, FIN. TIMES: LIFE & ARTS (Mar.
20, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/19d90308-6858-11ea-a3c9-1fe6fedcca75.
7
See Laura Bradford et al., COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps: A Stress Test for Privacy,
the GDPR, and Data Protection Regimes, 7 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 1–2 (2020) (referring to
Google and Apple recently announcing their intention to build interfaces to allow
Bluetooth contact tracking using Android and iPhone devices); Press Release, Apple,
Apple and Google Partner on COVID-19 Contact Tracing Technology (Apr. 10, 2020),
https://www.apple.com/uk/newsroom/2020/04/apple-and-google-partner-oncovid-19-contact-tracing-technology.
8
JEFFREY P. KAHN, DIGITAL CONTACT TRACING FOR PANDEMIC RESPONSE: ETHICS AND
GOVERNANCE GUIDANCE 1 (2020).
9
Antonio Clim et al., Big Data in Home Healthcare: A New Frontier in Personalized
Medicine. Medical Emergency Services and Prediction of Hypertension Risks, 12 INT’L J.
HEALTHCARE MGMT. 241, 241 (2019).
3
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quarantine orders.10 It was assumed that such data could be used to
predict which urban areas were at risk.11
Governments and private companies believed that data about
individuals and their connections could be used to predict risks of
infection from specific individuals.12 For example, “[o]n March 13,
2020, Alphabet’s life sciences division, Verily, announced it was
developing a website to screen people for symptoms” of the virus.13
“After accessing the system, which required an active Google Account,
each user [was] assigned a COVID-19 risk score.”14
Mass surveillance and data-driven practices might make it possible
to facilitate early detection of viruses, achieve better diagnoses, map
the diffusion of the virus, and even predict areas of outbreak before
they materialize. Thus, a small Canadian Artificial Intelligence (AI)
startup, BlueDot, “spotted COVID-19 nine days before the [World
Health Organization] alerted people to the emergence of [the
virus].”15 Data-driven practices also allowed governments to identify
potential urban areas of outbreak. For instance, as part of a COVID19 research project which analyzed the spread of the virus, Facebook
asked users whether they had been infected with the virus in order to
generate “heat maps” of the outbreak and make new categories of data
available to scientists who specialize in studying epidemics through a
new program called Disease Prevention Maps.16 This initiative involved

10
Urs Gasser et al., Digital Tools Against COVID-19: Taxonomy, Ethical Challenges, and
Navigation Aid, 2 LANCET DIGIT. HEALTH e425 (2020) https://www.sciencedirect.com
/science/article/pii/S2589750020301370 (“These technologies can provide a
mechanism of ensuring that infected individuals are isolated from other individuals.
Examples include Taiwan’s Electronic Fence application that tracks quarantined
overseas arrivals using mobile phone data.”).
11
Alexander Martin, Coronavirus: Facebook to Produce ‘Heat Maps’ of COVID-19
Infections, SKY NEWS: SCI. & TECH. (Apr. 7, 2020, 2:02 PM), https://news.sky.com/story
/coronavirus-facebook-to-produce-heat-maps-of-covid-19-infections-11969776.
12
See, e.g., Refaella Goichman, Israeli Defense Ministry Teaming Up With Spyware Firm
NSO to Fight Coronavirus, HAARETZ (Mar. 29, 2020), https://www.haaretz.com/israelnews/2020-03-29/ty-article/.premium/israeli-defense-chief-plans-to-employ-spywarefirm-nso-in-fight-against-coronavirus/0000017f-db5f-d856-a37f-ffdf06810000.
13
Mason Marks, Emergent Medical Data: Health Information Inferred by Artificial
Intelligence, 11 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 995, 1004 (2021).
14
Id.
15
See Anindya Ghose & D. Daniel Sokol, Unlocking Platform Technology to Combat
Health Pandemics, YALE J. REGUL. (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc
/unlocking-platform-technology-to-combat-health-pandemics-by-anindya-ghose-andd-daniel-sokol.
16
Martin, supra note 11.
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sharing aggregated location data with partners in forty countries.17
Such a program would allow cooperation between countries.18
Data can be used to reduce the spread of the virus, and some
believe it can break chains of infection.19 As data suggests, a substantial
proportion of transmission occurs between individuals before
symptoms appear.20 As such, it was proposed that people who had
contact with carriers of the virus should be isolated from others.21 But
how will one know whether he had direct contact with an individual
who was infected? Data from smartphones, digital platforms, and
related technological ecosystems can be key to such knowledge.22
Mass surveillance and data-driven tools, however, infringe on
human rights and civil liberties such as privacy and freedom of
expression. Furthermore, individuals are not aware of the types of data
that states collect on them without their consent, how such data
transfers between authorities, and the ways authorities use it. These
methods provide neither transparency nor due process, and oversight
is insufficient. Without safeguards, a dangerous surveillance creep can
take place.23 States might collect and analyze personal information in
situations that are not emergencies. Moreover, some states use
national security agencies, instead of health agencies, to conduct
surveillance. In a related context, the Court of Justice of the European
Union in La Quadrature du Net v. Premier Ministre ruled that bulk data
collection by European Union national agencies was illegal; however,
the court allowed for an exception in cases of serious threat to national

Id.
See id.
19
Sofia K. Mettler et. al, Diagnostic Serial Interval as a Novel Indicator for Contact
Tracing Effectiveness Exemplified with the SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 Outbreak in South Korea, 99
INT’L J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 347 (2020) (claiming that “a well-functioning contact
tracing system leads to shorter diagnostic serial intervals, which can, in turn, contribute
to breaking chains of infections”).
20
KAHN, supra note 8, at 14.
21
Chandini Raina MacIntyre, Case Isolation, Contact Tracing, and Physical Distancing
are Pillars of COVID-19 Pandemic Control, not Optional Choices, 20 LANCET:
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1105 (2020), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles
/PMC7834806/pdf/main.pdf.
22
See Ghose & Sokol, supra note 15.
23
See Matthew Tokson & Ari Ezra Waldman, Social Norms in Fourth Amendment Law,
120 MICH. L. REV. 265, 271 (2021) (“State and local governments [have recently]
deployed industry-designed contact tracing apps to monitor COVID-19 outbreaks, with
little infrastructure in place to guard against government use of the apps’ data for
surveillance purposes.”).
17
18
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security.24 Recently, in the Grand Chamber of the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) case of Big Brother Watch v. United Kingdom, the
court also ruled that mass data interception violated the right to
privacy,25 rejecting the regime of bulk collection and interception, and
holding that the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA)
was incompatible with Articles 826 and 10 of the European Convention
on Human Rights.27 “The ruling is particularly relevant now as
national governments are increasingly relying on intrusive methods of
data collection and contact tracing to prevent the spread of COVID19.”28 It can be argued, however, that even though the ECtHR rejected
this regime in the context of national security, the result might have
been different in the context of health.
Moreover, governments around the world conduct mass
surveillance on citizens and develop emergency regulations and
exceptions in the public health context. The term “police state” is now
becoming relevant not only to authoritarian regimes, but also to
democracies.29

24
See generally Joined Cases C-511/18, C-512/18 and C-520/18, La Quadrature du
Net and Ordre des Barreaux Francophones et Germanophone v. Premier Ministre,
ECLI:EU:C:2020:791 (Oct. 6, 2020).
25
Big Brother Watch v. United Kingdom, App Nos. 58170/13, 62322/14, 24960/15,
¶¶ 522, 528 (May 25, 2021), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-210077; see also
David Heaton, Grand Chamber Confirms UK Secret Surveillance Regime Unlawful in Big
Brother Watch v United Kingdom, BRICK CT. CHAMBERS: NEWS & EVENTS (May 26, 2021),
https://www.brickcourt.co.uk/news/detail/grand-chamber-confirms-uk-secretsurveillance-regime-unlawful-in-big-brother-watch-v-united-kingdom; Asaf Lubin,
Introductory Note, Big Brother Watch v. United Kingdom (Eur, Ct, H.R.Grand Chamber),
61 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 605 (2022).
26
Big Brother Watch, at ¶¶ 425–27.
27
Id. at ¶¶ 456–58 (“[I]n view both of these weakness, and those identified by the
Court in its consideration of the complaint under Article 8 of the Convention, it finds
that there has also been a breach of Article 10 of the Convention by virtue of the
operation of the section 8(4) regime.”).
28
Monika Zalnieriute, Big Brother Watch and Others v. The United Kingdom, 116 AM.
J. INT’L L. 585, 586 (2022).
29
Limor Shmerling Magazanik, Use of Digital Means to Fight the Coronavirus, ISR.
TECH. POL’Y INST. (Mar. 16, 2020), https://techpolicy.org.il/blog/use-of-digitalmeans-to-fight-the-coronavirus (“In grappling with the COVID-19 pandemic,
humanity has many more tools than it ever had. These may come in handy in
overcoming the disease as a significantly lower loss of human lives. Nonetheless, we
must be cautious, responsive, and proportionate in employing these measures. In the
absence of independent checks and balances, we risk letting in one of the biggest
threats to democracy: a Police State.”).
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“In the digital age, privacy against the state remains an essential
part of political freedom.”30 The Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution protects “against unreasonable searches and
seizures,” including cell phone site location data.31 In most cases,
reasonableness requires that the government have probable cause that
justifies granting a warrant before conducting a search; however,
“warrants are not required when ‘exigent circumstances’ make getting
them unfeasible.”32 Any disease surveillance program is likely to be
evaluated under the Fourth Amendment’s “special needs doctrine”33
(also called the “administrative search doctrine”) by which courts
sometimes permit warrantless surveillance with less than probable
cause. Such a search might occur if getting a warrant would be
impracticable, the search is aimed at something other than a
traditional law enforcement purpose, or the search is altogether
reasonable.34 When courts broadly deem all types of state surveillance
and data collection reasonable, or allow warrantless surveillance,
under special needs programs, however, there may be grave
consequences to civil liberties. Unfortunately, the virus was used to
permit warrantless mass surveillance and “normalise the development
of mass surveillance tools in countries that have so far rejected them.”35
NEIL RICHARDS, WHY PRIVACY MATTERS 133 (2022).
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2206–07 (2018); Matthew Tokson,
The Aftermath of Carpenter: An Empirical Study of Fourth Amendment Law, 2018–2021, 135
HARV. L. REV. 1790, 1792 (2022).
32
Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Disease Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, LAWFARE
(Apr. 7, 2020, 1:54 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/disease-surveillance-andfourth-amendment; Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967).
33
Barry Friedman, Lawless Surveillance, 97 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022)
(manuscript at 22) (on file at SSRN), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4111547 (“‘[S]pecial needs’ searches (where we conclude),
courts find the government’s conduct to be a ‘search’ governed by the Fourth
Amendment, but require neither warrants or probable cause. Rather, government
information collection simply requires regulatory prerequisites in place before
collection occurs.”).
34
See Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Digital Disease Surveillance, 70 AM. U. L. REV. 1511, 1541
(2021) (referring to L.A. v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 420 (2015)); see also Amitai Etzioni,
iPhone vs. Trump: How Technology Companies Can Protect Both Customers and National
Security, NAT’L INT. (Jan. 19, 2020), https://nationalinterest.org/feature/iphone-vstrump-how-technology-companies-can-protect-both-customers-and-national-security.
35
Yuval Noah Harari, The World After Coronavirus, supra note 6; Linda Lew, Homo
Deus Author Yuval Harari Shares Pandemic Lessons From Past and Warnings for Future, S.
CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article
/3077960/homo-deus-author-yuval-harari-shares-pandemic-lessons-past-and-warnings
(stating the global pandemic might drive the development of mass surveillance). See
also Christopher J. Coyne & Yuliya Yatsyshina, Pandemic Police States 2 (Geo. Mason
30
31
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Moreover, even without exigent circumstances, it should be noted
that “while technological developments continue at a meteoric pace,
courts engage[d] in an [eighteenth] century version of common law
decision-making” that did not provide tools for decision-making, and
Thus,
thus failed to prevent the use of mass surveillance.36
governments are now engaged in mass collection of information,
without warrants, that could result in a surveillance state.
This Article focuses on governments’ widespread use of mass
surveillance and data-driven tools during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Part II will describe how governments used technologies, which were
unimaginable even a short time ago, to engage in mass data collection
in order to gain health information. Part III will conduct a taxonomy
of data-driven practices that were used to protect the public’s health.
Next, Part IV explores the flip side of surveillance tools by examining
how they infringe on privacy, considering that they are used without
transparency, oversight, due process, or other safeguards. Part IV also
addresses the infringement of privacy and its impact on trust, equality,
and freedom of expression, as well as the potential erosion of
democracy. In some contexts, it should be noted that this surveillance
creep has already occurred.37 Part V warns about the rise of the
surveillance state in the shadow of a health emergency and argues that
individuals should still enjoy both civil rights and health going forward,
despite what the responses to COVID-19 have caused. It proposes
adopting a privacy-by-design approach38 that will limit the access of
authorities to personally identifiable information and limit the use of
information to specific ad hoc warnings without keeping it. This

Univ. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 20-25, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3598643 (noting state actions without legal authority “can be
extended beyond surveillance to refer to the wide range of activities undertaken by
states in the name of addressing the pandemic”).
36
Friedman, supra note 33, at 21 (“We live in an age of lawless surveillance, and
when it comes to doing something about it, we’re getting nowhere fast.”).
37
See NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE
DIGITAL AGE 98 (2015); Friedman, supra note 33, at 14 (“[T]he ‘very serious threat to
the future of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law around the world.’”).
38
Privacy by design is an approach that incorporates thinking about privacy
protective features and implementing them as early as possible. See generally CHRIS JAY
HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY 190–91 (2016);
KENNETH A. BAMBERGER & DEIRDRE K. MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND: DRIVING
CORPORATE BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 32, 178 (2015); Cf. COURTNEY
BOWMAN ET AL., THE ARCHITECTURE OF PRIVACY: ON ENGINEERING TECHNOLOGIES THAT
CAN DELIVER TRUSTWORTHY SAFEGUARDS 13 (2015); ANN CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN:
TAKE THE CHALLENGE 3 (2009).

500

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:491

Article further proposes anonymization techniques that would allow
for beneficial uses of the information, including predictions and
research of virus outbreaks. Next, this Article proposes safeguards
against mass surveillance, including fiduciary duties, transparency,
oversight, and due process in proceedings based on digital surveillance
or automated decisions. Finally, this Article rejects altogether the
practices of intrusive surveillance that can erode democracy with no
way back.
II. SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM AT THE SERVICE OF THE STATE OF
SURVEILLANCE: AN OVERVIEW
The mass collection of information, the Internet of Things, big
data, and artificial intelligence opens a new dimension for surveillance,
data collections, and analysis by commercial corporations and
governments.39 Private lives of individuals are an open book to
companies that have access to their data.40 These companies can see
the places a person visits every minute of the day and draw conclusions
about him.41 Surveillance capitalism marks the new economic order of
Constant private surveillance and
the twenty-first century.42
documentation of the public’s behavior is the “new oil” for commercial
purposes.43 Today, tracking technology is used nearly everywhere, far
beyond the desktop of a computer.44 These technologies are part of

See Friedman, supra note 33, at 9.
See Stuart A. Thompson & Charlie Warzel, Opinion, Twelve Million Phones, One Dataset,
Zero Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/19
/opinion/location-tracking-cell-phone.html.
41
Friedman, supra note 33, at 9 (“Finally, there’s the technology, largely AI driven,
to pull all this information together into a remarkably complete picture of who you
are, what you are doing, and what you might do next[,] . . . [including, for example,]
the Department of Homeland Security’s Fast Attribute Screening Technology (FAST),
a set of ‘behavior-based screening techniques’ to ferret out who is safe to fly and who
not.”).
42
See generally SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT
FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2019) (coining the term
“surveillance capitalism” and explaining its impact on commerce, free will, and
society).
43
See Jonathan Vanian, Why Data Is the New Oil, FORTUNE (July 11, 2016, 8:35 PM),
https://fortune.com/2016/07/11/data-oil-brainstorm-tech.
44
Paul Ohm & Nathaniel Kim, Legacy Switches: A Proposal to Protect Privacy, Security,
Competition, and the Environment from the Internet of Things, OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming
2023) (manuscript at 5), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4149789 (“Almost all IoT devices
embed tiny computers that wirelessly connect to the internet, our smartphones, and
one another. Even when everything works as planned, these devices contribute to a
39
40
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peoples’ daily lives through smart connected devices and wearables,
thereby producing incidental information—including biometric
data—which leaves a digital trace that companies can exploit for
marketing and financial gain.45
In times of crisis, the state can use the same methods of data
collection analysis and prediction that private companies utilize to
promote commerce and enhance their profits.46 Thus, during the
COVID-19 crisis, some states accessed “granular user data from CCTV
surveillance footage, GPS tracking data from phones[,] . . . credit card
transactions[,] and ATM records from financial service firms.”47
Governments gained smartphone location data and other personal
information by tracking infected people and the people they were in
contact with, thereby attempting to break the infection chain by
ensuring those people stayed home.48
Such practices resemble the concerning mass surveillance of the
KGB (the Committee for State Security). The KGB was established in
1954 as an outgrowth of several Soviet security organizations.49 Its
primary role was to protect the regime, gather and analize information
that enhanced the government’s understanding of its adversaries, and
impose conformity on the population by placing everyone under

growing and pervasive surveillance society, creating a detailed record of what
individuals and groups do, say, think, and feel.”).
45
See Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 140
(2017) (“[N]ew techniques for customer tracking, immersive social design, and data
analysis all promised new possibilities for profiting from targeted marketing in an
increasingly fragmented media ecosystem.”); Matthew B. Kugler, From Identification to
Identity Theft: Public Perceptions of Biometric Privacy Harms, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 107, 115
(2019).
46
Bradford et al., supra note 7, at 11.
47
See The Use of Digital Enforcement in Light of COVID-19, ALLOT 5 (2020),
https://www.allot.com/resources/SB_Digital_Enforcement_After_COVID19.pdf
(“Countries such as France, Germany, Israel, USA and the United Kingdom have
unleashed their Intelligence and Law enforcement agencies with the hope that by
controlling the crowd they may be able to control the virus. . . . The digital
technologies used to fight COVID-19 were made possible by shifting the control and
traffic of national networks from telecom providers to the Government itself. . . . Data
from CCTV surveillance, credit card information, facial recognition, Internet
surveillance, GSM and IP-based geolocation, and others are now rapidly and securely
collected.”). See also Ghose & Sokol, supra note 15, at 2–3.
48
See Ghose & Sokol, note 15, at 2; KAHN, supra note 8, at 13; Shira Ovide, Can Our
Phones Stop a Pandemic?, N.Y. TIMES: TECH. (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com
/2020/04/10/technology/coronavirus-smartphones-surveillance.html.
49
Andrei Soldatov & Irina Borogan, Russia’s New Nobility – The Rise of the Security
Services in Putin’s Kremlin, 89 FOREIGN AFFS. 80, 82, 86 (2010).
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surveillance. To do so, the KGB used “a network of informers so dense
that there was not a club, apartment building, or work brigade without
one.”50 Fifty years ago, however, it was impossible for the KGB to follow
all Soviet citizens twenty-four hours per day; as such, “[t]he KGB relied
on human agents and analysts.”51 Technology changed that
predicament because “now governments can rely on ubiquitous
sensors and powerful algorithms instead of flesh-and-blood spooks.”52
The government can now use cell phones,53 the Internet of Things,54
CCTV,55 automated license plate readers (ALPRs),56 and even drones
for surveillance.57 Orwellian watchers observe our every move,
infringing on privacy and other civil rights by making surveillance a
part of life.58
The most notable example is China. By closely monitoring
people’s smartphones, making use of hundreds of millions of facerecognition cameras, and obliging people to check and report their
body temperatures and medical conditions, the Chinese authorities
attempted to identify suspected COVID-19 carriers, track their
movements, and identify anyone who came into contact with the

Aaron Bateman, The KGB and Its Enduring Legacy, 29 J. SLAVIC MIL. STUD. 23, 24
(2016).
51
See Harari, The World After Coronavirus, supra note 6.
52
Id.
53
See Mark Surman, Privacy Norms and the Pandemic, MOZILLA BLOG (Apr. 22, 2020),
https://blog.mozilla.org/blog/2020/04/22/privacy-norms-and-the-pandemic.
54
See generally Ohm & Kim, supra note 44.
55
CCTV can be utilized for facial recognition. See Coyne & Yatsyshina, supra note
35, at 7 (“The Chinese government has leveraged its extensive surveillance system to
monitor and track citizens. It has also installed CCTV cameras outside the apartments
of those quarantined in order to monitor their movements. In Moscow the police have
used the government’s existing camera system along with facial recognition
technologies to monitor people who violate mandatory self-isolation.”).
56
For discussion on this technology, see Friedman, supra note 33, at 10 (“AI now
allows ordinary low-cost cameras to become license plate readers.”).
57
Coyne & Yatsyshina, supra note 35, at 8 (“Governments in countries around the
world, including the United Kingdom and the United States, are using drones to
monitor citizens and enforce social distancing dictates.”); see, e.g., Rob Picheta, UK
Coronavirus Response Criticized as People Are Filmed by Drones and Stopped While Shopping,
CNN: WORLD (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/31/uk/uk-policecoronavirus-tactics-gbr-intl-scli/index.html.
58
See Massaro et al., supra note 4, at 269 (“Strategies for virus containment may
implicate equality in other ways that relate to privacy and policing. Take, for example,
contact tracing. Tracking the movements of infected individuals and identifying those
with whom they come into contact triggers liberty concems, because it implicates
information about an individual's whereabouts that many would regard as private.”).
50
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suspected carriers.59 A range of mobile applications (“apps”) warned
citizens about their proximity to infected patients, isolated people who
returned from infected areas, and notified persons who had been in
touch with infected individuals.60
“One of the leading Chinese monitoring apps, Alipay Health
Code, use[d] a traffic light system, with a red light requiring
mandatory hospital quarantine. Only those whose phone displays a
green light are allowed to use facilities such as public transit.”61
Additionally, “Chinese surveillance went as far as forcibly installing
cameras inside people’s homes, or just outside their front doors, to
make sure they complied with quarantine rules.”62
China is not a democracy, and it has a tradition of tracking people
even before COVID-19 started to spread. China’s state surveillance
practices include facial recognition software, CCTV monitoring,
tracking of credit card purchases, and more.63 The data allows the
operation of China’s governmental “social credit system.”64 “This
system takes the idea of creditworthiness and exports it to all areas of
life with the help of big data. Every piece of data on every citizen is
used to rate that person on a scale of trustworthiness.”65 The social
credit system “rewards and punishes citizens based on characteristics
such as honesty, norm-following, and general courtesy, and it appears
that biometric tracking is being used to further increase the system’s
accuracy.”66 China repurposed the infrastructure of its social-credit
59
Joyce Huang, China’s Virus Tracking Technology Sparks Privacy Concerns, CHINA
NEWS (June 22, 2020) https://www.voanews.com/a/covid-19-pandemic_chinas-virustracking-technology-sparks-privacy-concerns/6191538.html.
60
See Lucy Alexander, In Asia, Contact Tracing Apps Have Helped Contain COVID-19.
Now They May Be Coming to the U.S., ROBB REP. (Mar. 30, 2020),
https://www.robbreport.com/gear/personal-technology/covid-19-big-tech-apps2908811.
61
Id.
62
CARISSA VELIZ, PRIVACY IS POWER: WHY AND HOW YOU SHOULD TAKE BACK CONTROL
OF YOUR DATA 61 (2020).
63
Facial Recognition and Beyond: Journalist Ventures Inside China’s ‘Surveillance State’,
NPR (Jan. 5, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/01/05/953515627/facialrecognition-and-beyond-journalist-ventures-inside-chinas-surveillance-sta.
64
Katie Canales, China’s ‘Social Credit’ System Ranks Citizens and Punishes Them With
Throttled Internet Speeds and Flight Bans if the Communist Party Deems Them Untrustworthy,
INSIDER (Dec. 24, 2021), https://www.businessinsider.com/china-social-creditsystem-punishments-and-rewards-explained-2018-4.
65
VELIZ, supra note 62, at 60.
66
Kugler, supra note 45, at 115; see Xin Dai, Toward a Reputation State: The Social
Credit System Project of China (2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Peking
University
Law
School),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
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scoring for tracing COVID-19 efforts.67 Local Chinese authorities have
announced that if Chinese citizens fail to report symptoms of the virus,
they could find themselves on social-credit blacklists.68
Tracking apps were used in many countries outside of China. In
Singapore, the government also uses tracking apps.69 In Singapore,
people can give the app “access to Bluetooth, and it logs every phone
you come into contact with”.70 “If you develop the virus, health
authorities get a record of your phone data so they can contact owners
of the other phones”.71 Data about others that the app collected,
however, will be unavailable to the people in Singapore.72
This health crisis has increased the use of mass surveillance, even
in states with long-term democratic traditions. In the United States,
elements of the national security state—that is, the National Security
Council (NSC), Pentagon, and intelligence—as opposed to civilian
public health agencies, developed a response to the virus.73 While the
U.S. government’s plans remained classified, reports revealed that the
military and intelligence communities were working with the NSC to
develop the government’s COVID-19 response.74 Subsequently, the
United States government analyzed smartphone location data and
reportedly planned to create a national surveillance system75 by using
_id=3193577); FRANK PASQUALE, NEW LAWS OF ROBOTICS: DEFENDING HUMAN EXPERTISE
IN THE AGE OF AI 136–39 (2020).
67
See generally Isobel Asher Hamilton, Chinese Citizens Who Conceal Any Coronavirus
History Are Being Punished Using the Country’s Dystopian Social Credit System, BUS. INSIDER
(Mar.
17,
2020)
https://www.businessinsider.com/china-hiding-coronaviruspunishable-social-credit-system-2020-3.
67
Id.
68
See Shandong Rongcheng, Social Credit Rewards and Punishments Help Win the
Battle of Epidemic Prevention and Control, ZHONGHONG (March 2, 2020, 11:08 AM),
http://www.zhonghongwang.com/show-382-166675-1.html.
69
Shira Ovide, Can Our Phones Stop a Pandemic?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/technology/coronavirus-smartphonessurveillance.html.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
See Whitney Webb, US Intel Agencies Played Unsettling Role in Classified and “9/11Like” Coronavirus Response Plan, MINT PRESS NEWS (Mar. 13, 2020),
https://www.mintpressnews.com/us-intelligence-unsettling-role-classified-9-11-likecoronavirus-response/265687.
74
Id.
75
See Chris Mills Rodrigo, Senate Democrat Presses White House on Reported Coronavirus
Surveillance System Efforts, HILL (Apr. 8, 2020), https://thehill.com/policy/technology
/491806-senate-democrat-presses-white-house-on-reported-coronavirus-surveillance.
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this data.76 Jared Kushner, a former Senior Advisor to President
Trump, reached out to several health technology companies about
creating a system to give the government real-time data on “where
patients are seeking treatment and for what, and whether hospitals can
accommodate them.”77 The White House operated in secret, without
transparency or safeguards.78 The White House also allegedly “ignored
a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)79 request made by the
Electronic Privacy Information Center and letters seeking details sent
from several senators.”80 Additionally, digital contact tracing
technology (DCTT) was proposed as part of a plan to reopen the
country,81 even though such apps are not precise—they work through
proxies and cannot tell if someone actually caught the virus.82
In Israel, the government approved regulations permitting the
Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) to collect data by tracking cell
phones of citizens without consent, using technology normally utilized
in counterterrorism.83 In approving the regulations, the government
circumvented the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee of the
Israeli Parliament (part of the unicameral legislature of Israel, called

76
See Casey Newton, The US Government Should Disclose How It’s Using Location Data
to Fight the Coronavirus, VERGE (Mar. 31, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com
/2020/3/31/21199654/location-data-coronavirus-us-response-covid-19-apple-google.
77
Danielle Citron & Geng Ngarmboonanant, Be Very Wary of Trump’s Health
Surveillance
Plans,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
16,
2020,
4:05
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/16/be-very-wary-trumpshealth-surveillance-plans.
78
Id.
79
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A); Tara Leigh Grove, Standing as an Article II Nondelegation
Doctrine, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 781, 828 n.205 (2009) (“FOIA permits any person to
request any type of information . . . without demonstrating any distinct interest in or
particular need for the material.”); see also Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Visible Policing:
Technology, Transparency, and Democratic Control, 109 CALIF. L. REV. 917, 928 (2021).
80
Citron & Ngarmboonanant, supra note 77. It should be noted that open-data
requests and lawsuits for privacy violations that follow are useful in other contexts but
are not likely to be useful in the context of the COVID-19 surveillance. On such opendata requests and lawsuits that follow, see Bloch-Wehba, supra note 79, at 957, 961–62,
970.
81
KAHN, supra note 8, at 1.
82
VELIZ, supra note 62, at 182.
83
Judah Ari Gross, Government Okays Mass Surveillance of Israelis’ Phones to Curb
Coronavirus, TIMES ISR. (Mar. 15, 2020) https://www.timesofisrael.com/governmentokays-mass-surveillance-of-israelis-phones-to-curb-coronavirus (“Government officials
stressed that the use of these tools, usually reserved for counterterrorism operations,
was meant to save lives.”).
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the Knesset) in the process.84 Ministers authorized the move despite
the Justice Ministry’s commitment to have it go through the Israeli
Parliament, excusing it in that there was no time to deliberate the
matter.85 The regulations also authorized Israeli Police to track cell
phones of individuals who tested positive for the virus and
subsequently collect data on their whereabouts two weeks prior to
diagnosis.86 Furthermore, the regulations allowed tracking of those
who were suspected of having caught the virus and monitored
adherence to quarantine orders.87 Unlike the requirement for a
warrant to track cell phone data in criminal cases,88 no court order
authorized collection of data in these instances, nor were there any
regulatory prerequisites or other safeguards.89 Such surveillance was
not focused on a specific individual—rather, it was mass surveillance.90
Everyone was a suspect of spreading the virus.

84
See Noa Landau, In Dead of Night, Israel Approves Harsher Coronavirus Tracking
Methods Than Gov’t Stated, HAARETZ (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.haaretz.com/israelnews/2020-03-17/ty-article/.premium/cellphone-tracking-authorized-by-israel-to-beused-for-enforcing-quarantine-orders/0000017f-e6de-dc7e-adff-f6ff22150000.
85
Id. (“Ministers authorized the move despite the Justice Ministry’s commitment
to have it go through the Israeli parliament, which did not have the time to deliberate
on the matter.”).
86
See Amir Cahane, The Israeli Emergency Regulations for Location Tracking of
Coronavirus Carriers, LAWFARE (Mar. 21, 2020, 12:45 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com
/israeli-emergency-regulations-location-tracking-coronavirus-carriers.
87
Id.
88
Landau, supra note 84 (explaining that normally, a court order is required for
cell phone tracking, as it is “a serious invasion of privacy if there is no basis for it”); see
Ariane de Vogue & Clare Foran, Supreme Court: Warrant Generally Needed to Track Cell
Phone Location Data, CNN (June 22, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/22
/politics/supreme-court-ruling-cell-phone (explaining that in the United States, after
the Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter, mass cell phone location data generally
requires a warrant); Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220–21 (2018)
(accessing historical records containing physical locations of cell phones necessitates
a search warrant); see generally Tokson, supra note 31 (expanding on the tests of
Carpenter for revealing information and how they were used in the aftermath of the
decision).
89
Bradford et al., supra note 7, at 14–15 (“Such non-consensual tracking, as well as
default sharing of data with law enforcement and national security services, greatly
increases the risks that agencies may abuse their authority and use public health data
for illegitimate surveillance, law enforcement, or targeting purposes.”).
90
See generally Bloch-Wehba, supra note 79, at 949 (“[T]he Supreme Court in the
recent cases of Jones and Carpenter ruled that pervasive, long-term location tracking is
the subject of Fourth Amendment protection, it remains unclear how those decisions
fit with the longstanding rule that searches of public information are not really
‘searches’ at all.”).
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The Israeli Ministry of Health used the data that was collected
from cell phones to notify individuals of potential contact with
someone infected with the virus and to enforce quarantine orders.
The Ministry of Health was allowed to keep the data for the sake of an
internal inquiry of activities they conducted.91
The regulations faced public criticism for allowing mass
surveillance by using tools preserved for terrorists. Due to such
infringement on human rights, lawyer Shachar Ben Meir, the
Association of Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), and others, petitioned the
Israel High Court of Justice to challenge the Israeli government
decision to authorize the national security agency and the police to
conduct mass surveillance.92 The Israeli High Court of Justice ordered
the state to limit the Israel’s Security Agency’s (ISA) use of the powers
under the emergency coronavirus regulations and forbade police use
of such powers until further notice.93 After the High Court’s decision,
the Israeli government temporarily extended the authority to track
citizens for another period, and it was set to approve a motion that
would enshrine the tracking of cell phones belonging to confirmed
COVID-19 carriers in law.94 The passage of this legislation, however,
would allow mass surveillance to continue. After many public
objections, the government froze the bill.95 The government, however,
eventually restored the bill and continued to track citizens, moving
forward into a surveillance state.96 Only in March 2021, after another
Joshua Davidovich, The Night is Dark and Full of Tracking: 6 Things to Know for
March 17, TIMES ISR. (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.timesofisrael.com/the-night-is-darkand-full-of-tracking-6-things-to-know-for-march-17 (“Furthermore, the Health Ministry
is allowed to keep the data for another 60 days beyond the regulations’ expiration for
the sake of an ‘internal inquiry of the activities conducted by the Health Ministry.’”).
92
See HCJ 2109/20 Ben Meir v. Prime Minister (2020) (Isr.); Netael Bandel, Israel’s
Top Court: No Shin Bet Tracking of Coronavirus Patients Without Knesset Oversight, HAARETZ
(Mar.
19,
2020),
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2020-03-19/ty-article
/.premium/israels-top-court-no-shin-bet-tracking-of-coronavirus-patients-withoutknesset-ove/0000017f-e76c-dea7-adff-f7ffa1820000.
93
See HCJ 2109/20 Ben Meir v. Prime Minister (2020) (Isr.).
94
See Itamar Eichner, Israel to Enshrine in Law Shin Bet’s Coronavirus Tracking, YNET
NEWS (Apr. 5, 2020, 12:49 PM), https://www.ynetnews.com/article/rkLE6VpF8.
95
See Noa Landau & Jonathan Lis, Israel Freezes Bill Allowing Shin Bet Tracking of
Coronavirus Patients Due to Agency’s Objection, HAARETZ (June 8, 2020),
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-freezes-law-allowing-shin-bettracking-of-coronavirus-patients-1.8905478.
96
See Coronavirus in Israel: Knesset Advances Shin Bet Monitoring Bill, HAARETZ (June
25, 2020), www.haaretz.com/israel-news/coronavirus-live-government-agency-warnsagainst-events-in-closed-spaces-1.8936142; Jonathan Lis, Knesset Passes Temporary Law
Allowing Digital Tracking of Coronavirus Patients by Security Service, HAARETZ (July 1, 2020),
91
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High Court of Justice holding,97 was the surveillance limited only to
people that did not cooperate with an epidemiologic investigation.98
When governments around the world gain new abilities to trace,
track, and control citizens, they find it hard to relinquish such power
and tend to abuse it by taking more and more. Thus, on November
27, 2021, with the discovery of the Omicron variant in Israel, the
COVID-19 cabinet approved the resumption of ISA digital tracking of
confirmed COVID-19 carriers by the Shin Bet security agency.99 Again,
ACRI and others petitioned the Israel High Court of Justice and
challenged the Israeli government decision to authorize such mass
surveillance.100 Only after a sweeping public outcry did the Israeli
Government halt ISA’s surveillance concerning COVID-19.101
In addition to compulsory government surveillance tools, the
Ministry of Health in Israel launched “Hamagen” (The Shield), a new
smartphone app users could download voluntarily. This app seemingly
aimed to help prevent the spread of the virus “by enabling users to
know if they crossed paths with someone who has been diagnosed with
the virus” and telling users if they were in the presence of anyone who
tested positive.102 The app cross-checked the “GPS history of [a]
mobile phone with historical geographic data of patients from the
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2020-07-01/ty-article/.premium/knessetpasses-bill-allowing-digital-tracking-of-covid-19-patients-by-shin-bet/0000017f-dbfbdb5a-a57f-dbfb6da90000.
97
High Court Limits Shin Bet Coronavirus Surveillance to Those Who Won’t Cooperate,
TIMES ISR. (Mar. 1, 2021, 12:34 PM), https://www.timesofisrael.com/high-court-limitsshin-bet-coronavirus-surveillance-to-those-who-wont-cooperate (“The High Court of
Justice ruled on Monday that the Shin Bet security service’s controversial phone
tracking program, designed to detect coronavirus carriers and those who came in
contact with them, can only be used for those who don’t cooperate with
epidemiological investigations.”).
98
Id.
99
See Jonathan Lis & Ido Efrati, Israel Imposes Travel Ban for Foreigners, Stricter
Quarantine Over COVID Omicron Variant, HAARETZ (Nov. 27, 2021),
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israel-s-covid-cabinet-weighs-travel-restrictionsdigital-tracking-as-omicron-looms-1.10420085.
100
HCJ 8196/21 ACRI v. Ministry of Health (2021) (Isr.). See Amir Cahane, The
Collapsed Bridge Loan: Israel’s Shin Bet Location Tracking of Omicron Carriers, LAWFARE
(Dec. 16, 2021), https://www.lawfareblog.com/collapsed-bridge-loan-israels-shin-betlocation-tracking-omicron-carriers.
101
After Outcry, Government Scraps Shin Bet Phone Tracking of Omicron Carriers, TIMES
ISR. (Dec. 2, 2021, 9:19 PM), https://www.timesofisrael.com/government-scraps-shinbet-phone-tracking-of-omicron-carriers-after-outcry.
102
Stuart Winner, Health Ministry Launches Phone App to Help Prevent Spread of
Coronavirus, TIMES ISR. (Mar. 23, 2020, 12:19 AM), https://www.timesofisrael.com
/health-ministry-launches-phone-app-to-help-prevent-spread-of-coronavirus.
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Ministry of Health.”103 A more advanced version, HaMagen 2.0, was
based on both Bluetooth and GPS cell site location data.104
Israel took more surveillance and invasion measures beyond cell
phone tracking. For example, Israeli police deployed drones to
enforce quarantine orders and checked in on patients who were
ordered to self-isolate.105
Israel’s efforts to prevent the diffusion of the virus do not focus
only on tracking infected people and others who were around them.
Israel also tried to predict risks for individual infection. Accordingly,
NSO developed a system (“a notorious Israeli cyber intelligence
company for security”),106 “in cooperation with the Ministry of Defense
and the [Israel Defense Forces] . . . for handling information about
the probability that Israelis will be infected by the []virus.”107 The
government planned that every Israeli citizen would be assigned an
“‘infection rating’ on a scale of 1 to 10.”108 Such ratings were intended
to describe “the likelihood that that person is a coronavirus carrier.”109
The system was intended to be updated in real time. A “‘rating could
be 5.6 one day, and then jump to 9’—the rating is dynamic because it
depends on a person’s activities: for example, the rating can jump
103
See HaMagen 2.0, MINISTRY OF HEATH, govextra.gov.il/ministry-of-health
/hamagen-app/download-en (last visited Oct. 6, 2022).
104
See HaMagen 2 Application Was Launched, MINISTRY OF HEATH (July 27, 2020),
https://www.gov.il/en/departments/news/27072020_02 (“Currently, the application
detects two types of overlap points simultaneously: 1. Geographic tracking based on
GPS technology, which alerts of location-based points of proximity to COVID-19
patients. 2. Tracking based on Bluetooth technology, which allows us to detect points
of proximity between cellular devices on which this application was installed.”);
HaMagen 2.0 App Alerting Users Who Have Crossed Paths with a Coronavirus Patient Ready
for Distribution Among Owners of Android Devices, KNESSET (June 24, 2020),
https://main.knesset.gov.il/EN/News/PressReleases/Pages/press24620x.aspx; Press
Release, Ministry of Health, HaMagen 2 Application was Launched, (July 20, 2020),
https://www.gov.il/en/departments/news/27072020_02.
105
See Joseph Kraus, Israeli Police use Drones to Enforce Virus Quarantines, Rising Privacy
Concerns, TIMES ISR. (Apr. 14, 2020, 10:43 PM), https://www.timesofisrael.com/israelipolice-using-drones-to-enforce-coronavirus-quarantines.
106
NSO was later blacklisted by the US Commerce Department for providing
spyware to foreign governments that “‘used these tools to maliciously target’
journalists, embassy workers and activists.” Sean Lyngaas, US Blacklists Israeli Firm NSO
Group for Use of Spyware, CNN BUS. (Nov. 8, 2021, 11:57 AM), https://edition.cnn.com
/2021/11/03/tech/nso-group-us-blacklist/index.html.
107
See Yasmin Yablonko, Bennett Plans Using NSO to Rate Individual Virus Exposure,
GLOBES (Mar. 30, 2020, 2:19 PM), https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-bennett-plansusing-nso-to-rate-individual-virus-exposure-1001323878.
108
Id.
109
Id.
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because a person ‘visited a grocery store where two carriers visited in
recent days.’”110 This plan, which the Israeli government fortunately
neglected, attempted to use the social network and connections of
individuals to predict the risk that any person could infect others. In
fact, such a plan adopts a credit score system like China has.
Many other countries tracked cell phone locations and used
apps and data networks to keep tabs on the virus.111 Some were
compulsory, and some were voluntary. In the European Union (EU),
“Vodafone, Deutsche Telekom, Orange and five other telecoms
providers have agreed to shared mobile phone location data with the
European Commission to track the spread of the []virus.”112 Yet, “the
Commission planned to use anonymized data to protect privacy and
aggregate mobile phone location data to coordinate measures tracking
the spread of the virus.”113
Nations of the EU launched different apps to track the diffusion
of COVID-19.114 For example, Germany launched a smartphone app
to help trace infections. Because in Germany the use of individual
smartphone location data to track the spread of the virus is illegal
under national and EU privacy laws,115 the app attempted to track only
close-proximity Bluetooth “handshakes” between smartphones and
record and encrypt recent history of such contacts on the smartphone
device.116 Only if the smartphone’s owner tested positive for the virus
Id.
Countries Are Using Apps and Data Networks to Keep Tabs on the Pandemic, ECONOMIST
(Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2020/03/26/countries-areusing-apps-and-data-networks-to-keep-tabs-on-the-pandemic.
112
Foo Yun Chee, Vodafone, Deutsche Telekom, 6 Other Telcos to Help EU Track Virus,
REUTERS (Mar. 25, 2020, 3:06 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-healthcoronavirus-telecoms-eu/vodafone-deutsche-telekom-6-other-telcos-to-help-eu-trackvirus-idUSKBN21C36G.
113
Id.
114
See generally Costica Dumbrava, Lifting Coronavirus Restrictions: The Role of
Therapeutics, Testing, and Contact-Tracing Apps, EUR. PARLIAMENTARY RSCH. SERV. 22 (July
2020),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2020/652016
/EPRS_IDA(2020)652016_EN.pdf.
115
Douglas Busvine, Germany Aims to Launch Singapore-Style Coronavirus App in Weeks,
REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2020, 9:58 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-healthcoronavirus-germany-tech/germany-aims-to-launch-singapore-style-coronavirus-appin-weeks-idUSKBN21H26Z.
116
B. Sowmiya et. al, A Survey on Security and Privacy Issues in Contact Tracing
Application of COVID-19, 136 SN COMPUT. SCI. 2, 4 (2021) (“Germany launched its
application named ‘Corona Warn App’ which does not store the location of users by
concerning the Privacy of every user and it works together with Apple and Google.
The exposure Notifcation System on the device transmits a rolling proximity identifer,
110
111
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could the data be downloaded and transferred to the health
authorities to allow contact tracing teams to “get in touch with others
at risk.”117
The use of location data was also common to enforce quarantine.
Taiwan was one of the first countries to use a mobile-phone-based
“electronic fence” that used location tracking to ensure people who
were quarantined stayed in their homes.118 “The system monitor[ed]
phone signals to alert police and local officials if those in home
quarantine move[d] away from their address[es] or turn[ed] off their
phones.”119
In summary, countries and private companies used mass
surveillance and data-driven models in an attempt to combat the virus.
The following part will explore the use of such technologies and
models during the COVID-19 outbreak.
III. TAXONOMY OF DATA USES AND BENEFITS FOR COMBATING
DIFFUSION OF COVID-19
A. Warning of Exposure
Two years ago, “[t]he World Health Organization (WHO) . . .
urged countries to trace and track every COVID-19 case.”120 Tracking
each and every move of individuals through cell phone location data,
CCTV, and credit card purchases, and more, might make it possible
for governments to identify positive cases, isolate those individuals, and
warn others of any potential contact risks.121 When the virus started to
spread, many believed that surveillance could be used to trace infected
people, thereby breaking the infection chain.122 People believed that
mass surveillance would allow states to focus on people that were
while also regularly scanning for identifers of phones using Bluetooth technology and
storing the identifers locally. Those identifers are only valid for 20 min and derived
using Cryptography from dynamic keys which changes every 24 h.”).
117
See Busvine, supra note 115.
118
See Yimou Lee, Taiwan’s New ‘Electronic Fence’ for Quarantines Leads Wave of Virus
Monitoring, REUTERS (Mar. 20, 2020, 3:44 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ushealth-coronavirus-taiwan-surveillanc/taiwans-new-electronic-fence-for-quarantinesleads-wave-of-virus-monitoring-idUSKBN2170SK.
119
Id.
120
Ghose & Sokol, supra note 15, at 2.
121
See James G. Adams & Ron M. Walls, Supporting the Health Care Workforce During
the COVID-19 Global Epidemic, 323 JAMA 1439, 1439 (2020) (“Those . . . with symptoms
of suspected COVID-19 should be rapidly triaged and separated from the general
population . . . .”).
122
Ghose & Sokol, supra note 15, at 2.

512

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:491

already infected, or at severe risk to be infected, in order to avoid an
aggressive lockdown.123 South Korea implemented such an approach
by adopting robust surveillance and other measures to avoid
announcing an overall state-wide lockdown.124
B. Enforcement of Quarantine Orders
Individuals that were infected or were near infected people might
be a source of infection.125 “Quarantines and travel bans are often the
first response against new infectious diseases.”126 “In public health
practice, ‘quarantine’ refers to the separation of persons (or
communities) who have been exposed to an infectious disease.”127
“‘Isolation,’ in contrast, applies to the separation of persons who are
known to be infected.”128 Yet, in the time of COVID-19, “‘quarantine’
[referred] to both types of interventions, as well as to limits on
travel.”129
This controversial strategy of quarantines and isolation
measures130 was criticized by many scientists,131 including in The Great
123
See Gyooho Lee, Legitimacy and Constitutionality of Contact Tracing in
Pandemic in the Republic of Korea 3 (May 7, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with Chung-Ang University School of Law), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3594974.
124
Id. (“[T]he ability to trace and treat infected people has allowed South Korea to
avoid aggressive lockdowns.”); see also Anurag Viswanath, COVID-19 Lessons from South
Korea: Between Trust and Surveillance, FIN. EXPRESS (Apr. 1, 2020, 5:15 AM),
https://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/covid-19-lessons-from-south-koreabetween-trust-and-surveillance/1915089 (“Instead, the strategy was TRUST:
Transparency, Robust Screening and quarantine, Unique but universally applicable
testing, Strict control and Treatment.”).
125
See Massaro et al., supra note 4, at 236 (explaining that it was believed that people
that had symptoms or contact with an infected individual could present heightened
risk of infecting others).
126
See Wendy E. Parmet & Michael S. Sinha, COVID-19—The Law and Limits of
Quarantine, 382 NEW ENG. J. MED. e28(1) (2020).
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Martin Kulldorff et al., Our COVID-19 Plan Would Minimize Mortality and
Lockdown-Induced Collateral Damage, USA TODAY (Oct. 22, 2020, 8:27 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/todaysdebate/2020/10/22/covid-planwould-minimize-mortality-lockdown-induced-damage-editorials-debates/3735800001
(“The ‘Focused Protection’ plan in the Great Barrington Declaration would minimize
both COVID-19 mortality and lockdown-induced collateral damage on other health
outcomes.”).
131
See, e.g., @MartinKulldorff, TWITTER (Sept. 19, 2020, 1:55 PM),
https://twitter.com/MartinKulldorff/status/1307377809619288065
(“Contact
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Barrington Declaration.132 According to this strategy, everyone that
was exposed to an infected person should isolate himself.133 Everyone
should work to achieve the common objective of mitigating the crisis,
but individuals may fail to work together to achieve common good,
namely reducing the spread of COVID-19. While individuals in any
given group may share common interests with every other, each also
has conflicting interests on whether to stay isolated to mitigate the
spread of COVID-19, and whether it is worthwhile to sacrifice their
freedom for a potential benefit to the collective, even if isolation slows
the spread of the virus. To solve this collective action problem,134 and
despite criticism,135 states used and enforced quarantine orders. To do
so, they used cell phone location data, or other apps,136 and conducted
surveillance by using drones, to make sure that people that might have
tracing, testing and isolation is important against many infectious disease outbreaks,
such as Ebola and post-vaccine measles. It is ineffective, naïve, and counter-productive
against COVID19.”); @MartinKulldorff, TWITTER (Dec. 19, 2020, 12:45 PM),
https://twitter.com/MartinKulldorff/status/1340352578341789699 (“While contact
tracing and isolation is critically important for some infectious diseases, it is futile and
counterproductive for common infections such as influenza and #COVID19.”); Jay
Bhattacharya & Mikko Packalen, On the Futility of Contact Tracing, 5 INFERENCE, Sept.
2020, at 2 (COVID-19 “is too widespread for contact tracing to limit disease spread;
second, that errors in PCR tests substantially raise the human costs of contact tracing
and render it less effective; and finally, that contact tracing creates strong incentives
among the public to mislead public health authorities and avoid voluntary testing”.).
132
Many epidemiologists signed The Great Barrington Declaration and heavily
criticized “damaging physical and mental health impacts of the prevailing COVID-19
policies.” GREAT BARRINGTON DECLARATION, https://gbdeclaration.org (last visited
Aug. 28, 2022).
133
If You’ve Been Exposed to the Coronavirus, HARV. HEALTH PUBL’G (Aug. 25, 2022),
https://www.health.harvard.edu/diseases-and-conditions/if-youve-been-exposed-tothe-coronavirus.
134
See Collective Action Problem, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic
/collective-action-problem-1917157 (last visited Aug. 28, 2022); see also Frederik
Jørgensen et al., Compliance Without Fear: Individual-Level Protective Behaviour During the
First Wave of the COVID-19 Pandemic, 26 BRIT. J. HEALTH PSYCH. 679, 681–82 (2021)
(identifying compliance with coronavirus protective behavior as a collective action
problem).
135
See Bhattacharya & Packalen, supra note 131.
136
For example, “[t]he Polish government has introduced a new [“Home
Quarantine”] app that will require coronavirus patients to take selfies to prove they're
quarantining properly” for 14 days. Individuals that download the app “register a selfie
with the app, then periodically receive requests for geo-located selfies. If they fail to
comply, the police will be alerted.” Isobel Asher Hamilton, Poland Made an App That
Forces Coronavirus Patients to Take Regular Selfies to Prove They're Indoors or Face a Police
Visit, INSIDER (Mar. 23, 2020, 8:06 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/polandapp-coronavirus-patients-mandaotory-selfie-2020-3.
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posed a risk for infection stayed at home.137 Moreover, the police even
visited suspected violators, stepping in the direction of “the police
state.”138
C. From Individuals to Networks: General Mapping of Social Networks
and Predictions
Today, social networks seem to organize social life.139 “They are
always there, exerting both subtle influence over our choices, actions,
thoughts, feelings, and even our desires.”140 “Social networks can affect
the full spectrum of human experience.”141 The ties and connections
formed within them are crucial to understanding dissemination of
information and resulting behavior.142 The prisms of social networks
allow a new understanding of the spread of viruses because networks
and connections affect health.143 Mapping and identifying areas of
outbreak on social networks and visualizing a spreading pattern of the
virus might allow individuals to take more accurate measures to
combat the virus.144 Because charts and graphs are available for
everyone’s analysis, they can be used for measuring, calculating,
See Coyne & Yatsyshina, supra note 35, at 8; see also Picheta, supra note 57.
Michael D. Whitem & Henry F. Fradella, Policing a Pandemic: Stay-at-Home Orders
and What they Mean for the Police, 45 AM. J. CRIM. JUSTICE 702(2020); Coyne & Yatsyshina,
supra note 35, at 2 (“As the range of government responses illustrate, one implication
of COVID-19 is the rise of police states which, in the name of protecting public health,
limit the basic rights and freedoms of citizens and impose, often harsh, punishments
on those who fail to obey state dictates.”).
139
MANUEL CASTELLS, NETWORK LOGIC: WHO GOVERNS IN AN INTERCONNECTED
WORLD? 221 (2004).
140
NICHOLAS A. CHRISTAKIS & JAMES FOWLER, CONNECTED: THE SURPRISING POWER OF
OUR SOCIAL NETWORKS AND HOW THEY SHAPE OUR LIVES 7 (2009).
141
Id.; Michal Lavi, Content Providers’ Secondary Liability: A Social Network Perspective,
26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 855,889 (2016).
142
See CHRISTAKIS & FOWLER, supra note 140, at 7–9.
143
CHRISTAKIS & FOWLER, supra note 140, at 95–134 (describing how social
connections can influence health). See also Nicholas A. Christakis, THREAD READER
(Mar. 5, 2020), threadreaderapp.com/thread/1235566497591742464.html (“The
speed with which people acquired the flu during the epidemic depended on various
aspects of their social network position. Those with more friends, those who were
more central in the network, and those whose friends did *not* know each other got
it sooner.”).
144
See Baoquan Chen et al., Visual Data Analysis and Simulation Prediction for COVID19, 6 INT’L J. EDUC. EXCELLENCE 95, 95 (2020) (the researchers collected and visualized
publicly available data and showed patterns and characteristics of the pandemic
development. Such visualization allows for evaluating the effectiveness of some
pandemic control measures, and more importantly, to offer better preventive
measures).
137
138
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modelling and interpreting. Policy makers and governments can plan
a strategy for combating the virus based on insights available to them.
For example, mapping and visualizing the spread of the virus through
social networks allowed governments around the world to restrict
lockdowns to urban areas, avoiding restrictions on freedom of
movement in areas that were less risky.145
Data from online social networks, and data on networks collected
through DCTT, in a de-identified form, might prove useful to
professionals and researchers “to support population-level
epidemiologic analysis.”146 Such an analysis might even forecast the
spread of communicable viruses. Measuring the intensity of social
connectedness between locations might allow professionals and
researchers to draw conclusions on connectedness between areas.
Such conclusions can be deduced based on information and activity
on online social networks.147 Utilizing data from social networks
allowed professionals, researchers, and the tech industry to predict
virus outbreaks and improve allocation of resources.148 Of note, as part
of a research project, Facebook asked users whether they had been
infected with the virus and tried to generate “‘heat maps’ of the
outbreak” and “mak[e] new categories of data available to scientists
who specialise in studying [viruses] through a new program called
Disease Prevention Maps,”149 to model transmission of the virus.
Mapping and visualizing the outbreak allowed researchers to see
the big picture of the impact of the virus, track it on a day-to-day basis,
anticipate what may happen, and prepare for different outcomes.150
Looking at the big picture increases the likelihood of mitigating the
virus. “[S]ignificant transformation in the ability to collect massive
datasets” allows further analysis of data on networks by harnessing AI

See Lee, supra note 123 (explaining that mapping the spread of the pandemic in
South Korea “made it easier for the health authorities to see the coronavirus, to see
where it is located and where it may be lurking” and “to avoid aggressive lockdowns”).
146
KAHN, supra note 8, at 2.
147
See generally Theresa Kuchler et al., The Geographic Spread of COVID-19 Correlates
with Structure of Social Networks as Measured by Facebook (Cornell University, Working
Paper No. 26990, 2020).
148
See SINAL ARAL, THE HYPE MACHINE: HOW SOCIAL MEDIA DISRUPTS OUR ELECTIONS,
OUR ECONOMY, AND OUR HEALTH—AND HOW WE MUST ADAPT 234 (2020).
149
Martin, supra note 16.
150
See, e.g., Lucas Ropek, Boston Turns to Data Analytics to Track COVID-19 for
Residents, GOV’T TECH. (Mar. 20, 2020), www.govtech.com/analytics/Boston-Turns-toData-Analytics-to-Track-COVID-19-for-Residents.html (describing how Boston tracks
the spread of the pandemic by mapping it at the macrolevel).
145
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algorithms.151 Constant collection of “digital traces from large
segments of the population” might allow AI to draw conclusions on the
welfare of the population, as it can find hidden correlations stored in
large databases.152 AI algorithms can thereby monitor the spread of
infectious diseases and viruses. For example, “[d]uring the 2020
outbreak of coronavirus in Wuhan, China, journalists reported that
data mining algorithm of health information called BlueDot was the
first to warn of its spread.”153 AI algorithms can thus identify areas at
risk, predict how the virus will spread further, and direct resources to
cities that are most likely to be affected.
D. From Networks to Individuals
Social network analysis could help to deal with a crisis like the
outbreak of COVID-19. Mathematic graphs of networks can represent
entities (each is assigned to a node) and their relationships (each
relationship is represented by a line between two nodes). It was
believed that understanding networks might allow authorities to cut
the graph and quarantine all the close connections of an individual
that had been infected.154 For example, understanding networks can
help authorities to quarantine only the co-workers of the infected
individual, or only the individuals that were in his proximity.
Additionally, utilizing network analysis might improve Warning of
Exposure practices described in Part III.A.
Network analysis and big data could also be used to predict risks.
For example, Alphabet’s life sciences division, Verily, developed a
website to screen people for symptoms of the virus. “[A]fter accessing
the system, which require[d] an active Google Account, each user is
assigned a risk score.”155 Risk scores can be assigned based on
individuals’ data, their location, and their networks.156

Ghose & Sokol, supra note 15.
See Mason Marks, Emergent Medical Data: Health Information Inferred by Artificial
Intelligence, 11 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 995, 1020 (2021).
153
Id.; Ghose & Sokol, supra note 15.
154
See Ricardo Gonçalves, Performing Social Network Analysis to Fight the Spread of
COVID-19,
SISENSE,
https://www.sisense.com/blog/performing-social-networkanalysis-to-fight-the-spread-of-covid-19 (last visited Aug. 17, 2022).
155
See Marks, supra note 152, at 1004.
156
See Health Disparities Intensified by the COVID-19 Pandemic and Efforts to Mitigate,
VERILY (Apr. 24, 2020), https://blog.verily.com/2020/04/health-disparities-covid-19underserved-communities.html (“When it comes to health, location plays an
important role. Even within the same city, a study by the National Institutes of Health
found that life expectancy can vary widely from one neighborhood to the next. Black
151
152
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The idea that networks can influence welfare and health is not
new. More than a decade ago, Christakis and Fowler found that the
happiness of an individual is affected by the happiness of his friends
on social networks and even the happiness of friends of his friends.157
Similarly, a person’s network affects their risk of obesity.158 A person
with obese friends has a greater chance to become obese as well.159
Similarly, many believed that these insights on the influence of social
networks and relationships can be analogized to the risks of infection
from the virus. Knowing who your friends are can tell you what your
chances are of being infected. The speed with which people infect one
another depends on various aspects of their social network position.160
Those with more friends and those who are more central in their
network could get the virus sooner.161 Tracking human networks and
utilizing the information generated could predict risks more
accurately.
In Israel, the idea arose of utilizing human connections to predict
and mitigate risks from individuals to spread COVID-19 based on their
network. NSO, a notorious Israeli cyber intelligence company for
security, and spyware,162 cooperated with the Ministry of Defense and
Israel Defence Forces and developed a system that planned to handle
information about the probability of Israelis being infected by the
virus.163 According to this plan, every Israeli citizen was intended to
Americans are almost twice as likely to live in areas expected to be most affected by
COVID-19.”).
157
James H. Fowler & Nicholas A. Christakis, Dynamic Spread of Happiness in a Large
Social Network Longitudinal Analysis Over 20 Years in the Framingham Heart Study, BMJ 1,
7 (2008), https://www.bmj.com/content/bmj/337/bmj.a2338.full.pdf.
158
See Nicholas A. Christakis & James H. Fowler, The Spread of Obesity in a Large Social
Network Over 32 Years, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370, 370 (2007).
159
See id.
160
Rasim Alguliyev et al., Graph Modelling for Tracking the COVID-19 Pandemic Spread,
NAT’L LIB. MED. (2020), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7753933
(“In case of pandemic, the speed of infection depends on average number of people
one person can infect and the time needed for these people to become contagious.”);
Nicholas A. Christakis, THREAD READER (Mar. 5, 2020), threadreaderapp.com/thread
/1235566497591742464.html.
161
See Christakis, supra note 160.
162
The U.S. Department of Commerce has now blacklisted NSO for providing
spyware to foreign governments that “‘used these tools to maliciously target’
journalists, embassy workers and activists.” Sean Lyngaas, US Blacklists Israeli Firm NSO
Group for Use of Spyware, CNN BUS. (Nov. 4, 2021) (citation omitted),
https://edition.cnn.com/2021/11/03/tech/nso-group-us-blacklist/index.html.
163
See Gwen Ackerman & Yaacov Benmeleh, Surveillance Firm NSO Supplying Data
Analysis to Stop Virus, BLOOMBERG L. (March 17, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com
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have “an ‘infection rating’ from 1 to 10 describing the likelihood that
that person is a coronavirus carrier.”164 The plan also stated that “[t]he
system is updated in real time.”165 A person’s rating “could be 5.6 one
day, and then jump to 9 because [he] visited a grocery store where two
carriers visited in recent days.”166 Such a plan uses the social network
and connections of an individual to predict the risk that he will infect
others and triggers interventions that affect individual human rights
and civil liberties, such as the quarantining of an individual suspected
of being infected. Such an intrusive intervention can be performed
based on correlation, without reasoning, explanation, due process, or
transparency. Israel fortunately neglected this plan, and it was not
applied. China, however, has implemented such a solution through
using surveillance technologies to rate their citizens according to their
risk of infection, conducting algorithmic analyses based on a citizen’s
locations and medical history.167 The results of the algorithmic analysis
provide every citizen a different-colored health code reflecting his
risk.168 A high-risk score results in limitations on a citizen’s freedom of
movement.
After reviewing the practices of mass surveillance and data-driven
models that were used as an attempt to mitigate the spread of the virus,
the next Part will address their infringement on privacy and civil rights,
such as freedom of expression and procedural justice. Moreover, the
next Part will address the problem of surveillance creep that can result
from digital tracking and data collection, as well as the erosion of
democracy and rise of the surveillance state that will occur without
oversight and safeguards.

/news/articles/2020-03-17/surveillance-company-nso-supplying-data-analysis-to-stopvirus#xj4y7vzkg; see also Yablonko, supra note 107.
164
Yablonko, supra note 107.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
See VELIZ, supra note 62, at 63–68; Dong Huang et al., A Novel Risk Score to Predict
Diagnosis with Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Suspected Patients: A Retrospective,
Multicenter, and Observational Study, 92 J. MED. VIROLOGY 2709, 2711 (2020) (expanding
on risk factor and risk score).
168
Helen Davidson, China’s Coronavirus Health Code Apps Raise Concerns Over Privacy,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/01
/chinas-coronavirus-health-code-apps-raise-concerns-over-privacy (“The ‘health code’
service—run on the ubiquitous platforms Alipay and WeChat and developed for the
Chinese government––give users color-coded designations based on their health status
and travel history, and a QR code that can be scanned by authorities.”).
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IV. THE FLIP SIDE OF DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE
A. The Invasion of Privacy
Digital surveillance may allow governmental authorities and
agencies around the world to know where a person has been, whether
he was in proximity to another person, and whether he was at home or
not. When government agencies use drones to enforce a quarantine,
they can learn what a person’s home looks like, who a person lives with,
and other personal details about that individual.169 In addition,
governments can draw conclusions from network analyses on an
individual based on correlations without a causal link or
explanation.170 Aggregation of separate pieces of information and
their analysis can lead to more data—which can be deduced from the
analysis of an individual’s information—and concrete conclusions on
an individual. When governments conduct digital surveillance without
the consent of the tracked individuals or use individuals’ information
for purposes other than that which the data subjects consented to,
governments violate those individuals’ right to privacy. Such an
invasion causes harm per se. It infringes on individual privacy to be
free from intrusion and the freedom to exclude the public, which
Warren and Brandeis defined as “the right to be let alone,”171 and
Gavison defined as the limited right of access of others to our private
spaces.172
Beyond the infringement of the negative right to privacy, namely
the freedom from intrusion and notions of individual “rights to be let
alone,” mass surveillance disrespects individuality and personhood.173
The invasion of privacy hampers identity formation.174 A person who
169
On drones and privacy invasions, see Hadar Y. Jabotinsky & Michal Lavi, The Eye
in the Sky Delivers (and Influences) What You Buy, 24 U. PENN. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming
2022) (manuscript at 1–2) (on file with author) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3849218.
170
See generally Rebecca Williams, Rethinking Administrative Law for Algorithmic
Decision Making, 42 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD., 428 (2022) (“The increasing prevalence of
algorithmic decision making (ADM) by public authorities raises a number of
challenges for administrative law in the form of technical decisions about the necessary
metrics for evaluating such systems, their opacity, the scalability of errors, their use of
correlation as opposed to causation and so on.”).
171
See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890); see also DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 15 (2008).
172
See Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 446–47 (1980);
see also SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 171, at 20.
173
See SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 171, at 30.
174
See RICHARDS, supra note 30, at 115.
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knows that he is constantly watched and that the government collects
information on him feels like a tool in the government’s hands, not a
free individual with sensibilities, ends, and aspirations of his own.175
Thus, surveillance infringes on his dignity, personal autonomy, and
self-determination.176 The infringement of dignity can encroach on
freedoms, such as the freedom to choose and control one’s
information and make rational choices.177
The loss of control over personal information and the
infringement of privacy can result in several reactions. First, there are
reactions on the part of the data subject that would change his
behavior as a consequence of the violations of his privacy rights and
the violations of his trust. Second, governments and other data
processors can misuse the information to gain more control over
citizens and infringe on their civil rights and liberties. Privacy is not
only important on its own; the lack of privacy impacts other rights as
well.178 Surveillance infringes on the right to privacy by allowing for
conclusions on individuals health, which can reach the general public.
Moreover, surveillance can result in conclusions even about the
intimate parts of life, violating intimate privacy.179 The consequences
are beyond the violation of privacy in itself, as such information can
lead to undesirable stigmas, discrimination, and allow for the
manipulation of individuals.180
As the following subsections demonstrate, the outcomes of
infringing privacy are concerning.

See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1116–17
(2002).
176
ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN INFORMATION
AGE 26–27 (2018).
177
See id. at 29 (referring to IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS 71–72 (Mary Gregor trans., 1998)).
178
RICHARDS, supra note 30, at 68.
179
On the concept of privacy as intimacy, see Scott Skinner Thompson, Outing
Privacy, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 159, 161–62 (2015); Danielle Keats Citron, Presidential
Privacy Violations, ILL. L. REV. 1913, 1916 (forthcoming 2022).
180
I will further address the problem of stigma and discrimination in the next
subsections. For further information on the need for privacy for preventing stigmas,
see WALDMAN, supra note 176, at 24 (referring to ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON
THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 3, 31, 43, 78, 140 (1963)).
175
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B. Consequences of Invading Privacy
1. Chilling Effects of Surveillance—Effects on Individuals
i. Chilling Social Behavior
Surveillance infringes on privacy as a right to form relationships
in society.181 Privacy allows people to share information, behave and
interact in ways appropriate to their different roles, construct unique
norms for every context they operate in, and develop their interaction
in public places.182 Invasions into privacy by surveillance disrupt
relations in society. The problem increases in a digital world where
data is aggregated, analyzed, and used to categorize data subjects.183
Information is taken out of context and used to draw conclusions on
data subjects.184 If people knew that their government collected
information on their public activities and used it to draw conclusions
about them—and in turn limit their freedom—they might change
their behavior ex ante, behave differently, and even reduce their
interactions with others.185 In so doing, they would reduce the risk that
the government will take their behavior out of context. Thus, due to
the fear of future harm because of governmental surveillance,
individuals would self-chill their behavior and the flow of information
they create altogether.186 Even if there is any ambiguity regarding
whether the government conducts surveillance in specific
circumstances, individuals would likely “act the way they believe others

181
See, e.g., id. at 35 (describing how retail giant Target used a young woman’s
purchase history and other pieces of information to accurately guess that she was
pregnant and send her targeted advertisements); see Charles Duhigg, How Companies
Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/20112/02/1
9/magazine/shopping-habits.htm?pagewanted- &_r=l &hp.
182
See RICHARDS, supra note 30, at 38 (referring to ERVING GOFFMAN, INTERACTION
RITUALS: ESSAYS ON FACE TO FACE VIRTUAL (1967)).
183
On aggregation of data and algorithmic analysis, see FRANK PASQUALE, THE
BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION
165 (2015).
184
On a theory of information flow in context, see HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN
CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 4 (2010).
185
See Jonathon W. Penney, Understanding Chilling Effects, 106 MINN. L. REV. 1451,
1492–93 (2022) (explaining that people change their behavior while being watched.
This phenomenon is known as the “Hawthorne Effect”); GUILLERMO RAMIREZ-PRADO
ET AL., NON-INTRUSIVE BEHAVIOR AWARENESS FOR RESIDENTS OF A SMART HOUSE, 2019
IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BIG DATA 5269 (2019).
186
See Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Surveillance As Loss of Obscurity, 72 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1343, 1376–77 (2015).
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would act in the same circumstance.”187 In other words, they would
follow the norm, and that would lead to conforming—acting in ways
that are mainstream.188
ii. Chilling Intellectual Privacy and Freedom of Expression
Mass digital surveillance infringes on privacy. At first glance,
privacy conflicts with free speech because if there is more privacy, there
is less free speech. This view of the relationship of privacy and speech,
however, is misleading. A meaningful amount of privacy, what Neil
Richards calls “‘intellectual privacy,’ . . . is essential to a robust culture
of free expression” and safeguards democratic freedom.189
“[Intellectual Privacy] is the privacy necessary to produce speech,” as
opposed to privacy that protects against unwanted speech.190
Intellectual privacy includes three rights and liberties: (1) freedom of
thought;191 (2) the right to read freely;192 and (3) the right to
communicate in confidence.193 Mass digital surveillance infringes on
these rights.
Legitimizing and normalizing the deployment of digital mass
surveillance on citizens to combat the spread of the virus—by
collecting and analyzing information on the location of citizens, their
connections, and their social networks—is an infringement of
intellectual privacy. Individuals’ intellectual activities would be
disrupted if they knew that governments tracked their movement, their
data on their social networks and communications, and knew their
thoughts.194 This is because when individuals feel they are being
watched, they act differently.195 “[S]urveillance is permanent in its
Penney, supra note 185, at 1488; see also VELIZ, supra note 62, at 85 (when people
know they are being watched and that whatever they do could have bad consequences
for them, they tend to self-censor).
188
See RICHARDS, supra note 30, at 129; see also Penney, supra note 185, at 1459.
189
NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE
DIGITAL AGE 11 (2015); see also RICHARDS, supra note 30, at 7 (explaining that privacy
promotes instrumental values: identity building, freedom, and protects us as situated
consumers and members of society).
190
RICHARDS, supra note 189, at 11.
191
See id. at 109, 112.
192
See id. at 123–24.
193
See id. at 136, 138–39.
194
See id. at 106.
195
See Melissa Bateson et al., Cues of Being Watched Enhance Cooperation in a Real-World
Setting, 2 BIOLOGY LETTER 412, 412 (2006) (describing how workers put more money
in a break room honesty box as requested by a sign when the background of the sign
had eyeballs on it).
187
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effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action . . . .”196 Government
surveillance will chill intellectual experimentation and speech because
it causes individuals “not to experiment with new, controversial, or
Such surveillance infringes on freedom of
deviant ideas.”197
198
expression.
C. Lack of Trust—Lack of Cooperation with Health Authorities
Privacy builds trust in addition to shielding against invasion.199 If
states build trust in sharing information for combating COVID-19,
people might cooperate in solidarity for the health of others, even if
there is a price in their freedom. If, however, mass surveillance and
uses of personal information are without meaningful consent and
infringe on reasonable privacy expectations, trust is breached;
concerned citizens will change their social behavior and avoid
cooperating with the government.200 Failing to build trust in
information sharing, invading privacy, and misusing information leads
to a decay of trust,201 suspicion instead of solidarity. Consequently,
individuals will avoid adopting contact tracing applications, or
circumvent their operations. For example, they can put their
smartphone on “flight mode” disabling all wireless signals, Bluetooth,
and GPS location tracking,202 or simply leave their smartphone at
home.203 They might also avoid cooperating with epidemiologic
interrogations if they lose their trust in public health responses to the

See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 201
(Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed.1995) (1977).
197
RICHARDS, supra note 30, at 134.
198
Id. at 131–36. (expanding on privacy and freedom).
199
See Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19
STAN. TECH. L. REV 431, 464 (2016).
200
See, e.g., WALDMAN, supra note 176, at 53–54 (expanding on the importance of
trust between sharers of information).
201
See Citron, supra note 179, at 1932 (referring to governmental privacy violations,
such as abuses of private information for smear campaign that eroded the “faith in the
government’s commitment to protect the privacy of data that they have collected
about us.”).
202
What Does Flight Mode Mean on a Mobile Phone, METROFONE (June 25, 2022),
https://www.metrofone.co.uk/blog/what-does-flight-mode-mean-on-a-mobilephone.
203
KAHN, supra note 8, at 19.
196
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virus.204
Without trust, individuals will not disclose essential
information205 and will mislead health authorities.
1. The Direct Infringements of Mass Digital Surveillance
on Human Rights and Civil Liberties
i. Stigma and Discrimination
“Privacy protects us from being misdefined and judged out of
context . . . .”206 Surveillance and tracking infringes the right to privacy
and can result in stigmas, leading to discrimination.207 Such physical
or social labels deeply devalue and discredit an individual from gaining
full social acceptance.208 Stigma of infection was common regarding
the virus. When the virus started to spread, individuals that were
identified as testing positive for the virus, or a neighborhood that was
identified as a “hotspot” of infection, could become victims of stigma.
Society might associate them with illness, or treat them with hostility
based on their nationality, race, or town.209 In turn, society might
exclude, discriminate against, and reject, or even blame, them. The
blame directed towards Chinese people serves as a good example.210
Such a stigma can exacerbate already existing inequality, as in many
cases outbreaks occur in already marginalized population
concentrations.211 If data regarding positive test results, quarantine

204
See Massaro et al., supra note 4, at 252 (explaining that individuals will cooperate
only if they have confidence in the ability of institutions to protect safety, liberty, and
equality).
205
See WALDMAN, supra note 176, at 71.
206
JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 8
(2000); WALDMAN, supra note 176, at 28.
207
Danielle Keats Citron & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Harms, 102 B.U. L. REV. 793,
855–57 (2022) (“A key aspect of discrimination harms is the unequal frequency,
extensiveness, and impact of privacy violations on marginalized people. People of
color are disproportionately targeted by surveillance.”).
208
GOFFMAN, STIGMA, supra note 180, at 3.
209
See UNAIDS, RIGHTS IN THE TIME OF COVID-19: LESSONS FROM HIV FOR AN
EFFECTIVE, COMMUNITY-LED RESPONSE 8 (2020).
210
KAHN, supra note 8, at 71.
211
See, e.g., Ali Farhoudian et al., COVID-19 and Substance Use Disorders:
Recommendations to a Comprehensive Healthcare Response, 11 BASIC & CLINICAL NEURO SCI.
133, 141 (2020) (describing a “marginalized hard-to-reach population living in
crowded groups with lower access to healthcare. They usually suffer from poorer
health [and] weaker immune function . . . . Consequently, they have higher risk of
contracting COVID-19 and its transmission and casualties.”); Alan Z. Rozenshtein,
supra note 34, at 1554 (“Marginalized groups may also be subject to secondary
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orders, or areas of outbreak are made public for purposes outside of
public health, then those individuals are likely to be stigmatized or
discriminated against.212 For example, an employer may avoid hiring
an employee that lives in a “hot spot.”213 As mass surveillance
technology advances and the market gains more information on the
health of people, the use of such information without safeguards is
likely to exacerbate stigma and discrimination.
ii. Lack of Transparency and Infringement of Procedural
Justice
Mass surveillance has consequences to individual freedoms. In
countries where there is mandatory surveillance by using smartphones
for tracking, there are consequences for freedom of movement and
freedom of occupation.214 Exposure to an infected person restricted
these freedoms.215 If the information collected by surveillance showed
that the person had been near an infected individual, the government
could subject him to a quarantine order and isolate him. Such action,
however, might be justified in cases of crisis when the state interest in
public health permits that breach.216 Yet, while governments have
broad policing power in the area of public health217 and “are generally
allowed to enforce legislation not preempted by federal laws, even
emergency and health-protective laws must be consistent with the US
[sic] Constitution.”218

oversurveillance, if the data that is collected under the guise of disease prevention is
used more broadly.”).
212
See KAHN, supra note 8, at 71.
213
See id. at 84.
214
On surveillance and its implications on freedoms, see generally RICHARDS, supra
note 30.
215
See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 8, 2000, art. 1,
art. 16, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 12. This Charter articulates the universal values, such as
dignity, solidarity, freedom, and equality, on which the EU was founded. In the United
States, an individual’s right to conduct a business or pursue an occupation is a property
right. See Garrison v. Herbert J. Thomas Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, 438 S.E.2d 6, 14 (W. Va.
1993); United States v. Santoni, 585 F.2d 667, 673 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Arena, 180 F.3d 380, 394 (2d Cir. 1999), abrogated by Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women,
Inc., 537 U.S. 393 (2003).
216
See, e.g., Rozenshtein, supra note 34.
217
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24–25 (1905).
218
KAHN, supra note 8, at 86–87; see also Legal Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Sept. 17, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov
/quarantine/about lawsregulationsquarantineisolation.html; Friedman, supra note
33, at 22.
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Mass surveillance, however, operates without transparency and
due process, and the collection of information is not subject to judicial
review.219 A person can receive a quarantine order to isolate from
others without proof that he was in the proximity of an infected
person. For example, in Israel, the Shin Bet’s (ISA) mass surveillance
and quarantine orders led to chaos.220 “Reports contain[ed] stories of
tens of thousands of citizens receiving text messages warning them to
quarantine because of their alleged close contact with someone with
coronavirus, but many of the messages seem[ed] to be demonstrable
mistakes.”221 A person can be quarantined—yet at the time of the
claimed exposure to the infected person, he was alone at home222—
because a neighbor in his building had been infected,223 even if he was
not exposed to him.224 There were lots of false positives that were
quarantined.225 Furthermore, in states operating a risk scoring

219
In a related context of police digital surveillance, see Bloch-Wehba, supra note
79, at 921 (explaining that as police start to use sophisticated technologies, “such as
large DNA databases, social media monitoring, and facial recognition[,]” they often
do so surreptitiously. The result is that law enforcement surveillance accomplished by
means of sophisticated technologies is “often less visible to individual targets, the
judicial branch, and the public than their physical counterparts.”).
220
Yonah Jeremy Bob, Chaotic Start to Shin Bet Corona Surveillance, JERUSALEM POST
(July 5, 2020, 6:54 PM), www.jpost.com/breaking-news/shin-bet-surveillance-led-tothousands-of-people-getting-covid-19-texts-633959.
221
Id.
222
See id. (“A large volume of citizens has given stories to the media indicating that
at the time they were told they came into contact with someone with the virus (time of
supposed contact is the only information they are given) they were either asleep at
home or alone in their office.”).
223
See id. (“Some citizens who say they were misidentified speculated that the Shin
Bet tool might have identified them as coming within two meters of someone in their
office building who was on a different floor right below them, but that the tool cannot
grasp such subtleties.”).
224
VELIZ, supra note 62, at 182 (“The app might identify two people being in contact
who are in fact on different floors of the same building, or who are on the same floor
but separated by a thin wall.”).
225
See Dov Greenbaum, The Algorithm Behind the Jewish High Holidays Is More
transparent than Israel’s COVID-19 Fighting Tech, CALCALIST (Sept. 18, 2020),
https://www.calcalistech.com/ctech/articles/0,7340,L-3850238,00.html (“From the
program’s outset, it has been beset with reportedly thousands of false positives,
sending healthy and unexposed people to mandatory quarantine and creating further
distrust in the government and its various coronavirus fighting methods.”).
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system,226 an individual’s score can be degraded without justification.227
As a result of false positives, or erroneous calculation of the scoring
algorithm, individuals might be discriminated against and denied
entry from shopping centers, public transportation, and other
institutions.
Technologies of surveillance are opaque, and citizens have no
efficient way to appeal a quarantine order.228 Decisions on quarantine
that denied people their freedom should have been subject to
transparency.229 Failing to provide individuals with a means to contest
the factual basis for a decision to isolate them deprives them of due
process.230 Long-term data collectors, whether they belong to
governmental agencies around the world or private companies that
cooperate with governments, may use black box algorithms to analyze
the data they collect from citizens. Their opacity means that
individuals do not have any idea how they work and have no
opportunity to inspect the data and correct errors. The problem is
exacerbated when these algorithms determine too much about
freedoms and how individuals will be treated in society; the algorithms
can then be used to discriminate against individuals or marginalized
groups.231
Lack of due process and opportunity to contest the information
collected, and conclusions made based on that information, deprives
individuals of their constitutional right to due process and procedural

226
For example, see China and the plan to adopt a risk score in Israel that
fortunately was not adopted. Regarding China, see Catelijne Muller & Virginia
Dignum, Why the World Should not Adopt Chian QR-Code System, ALLAY (Nov. 25, 2020),
https://allai.nl/op-ed-why-the-world-should-not-adopt-chinas-qr-code-system.
227
For more information on the risk score to combat COVID-19, see Yablonko,
supra note 107.
228
For example, the Israeli Ministry of Health has “been inadequately staffed to
field all of the calls from citizens to verify or dispute the text they received” that order
them to be isolated. See Bob, supra note 220.
229
Transparency ensures the checks on government actions and is consistent with
the separation of powers. See Bloch-Wehba, supra note 79, at 922–23.
230
On the lack of due process in a scored society based on opaque algorithms, see
Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated
Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 7–8, 10–11 (2014).
231
See PASQUALE, supra note 183, at 165; Citron & Solove, Privacy Harms, supra note
207, at 857 (“Algorithms that appear neutral often have disproportionate effects on
minorities.”); Cade Metz & Adam Satariano, An Algorithm That Grants Freedom, or Takes
It Away, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/06/technology
/predictive-algorithms-crime.html.
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justice232 and exposes them to an arbitrary denial of their freedoms.233
Constitutional norms should not be suspended during the virus
outbreak.234 The public deserves to know what data on them is
collected, used, and shared; for how long will it be kept; and whether
the privacy invasion is necessary and proportionate to its benefits.235
The public has the right to due process and procedural fairness. These
norms do not dictate substantive outcomes, but rather provide
guideposts for decision making.236
iii. Surveillance Creep, the Police State, Manipulation, and
the Erosion of Democracy
Technology has made it possible for governments “to hoover up
unfathomable amounts of information on people: their location, their
habits, their expenditures[,] communications, [and] their
preferences.”237 COVID-19 was a catalyst for mass surveillance. Public
health priorities in quarantine enforcement and contact tracing led
states all around the world to adopt exceptional measures.238 Several
governments, such as Israel, used surveillance tools designed for
counterterrorism on all citizens.239 Such surveillance practices pose a
major problem for democracy. These practices normalize the
deployment of mass surveillance “in countries that have so far rejected
them[,]”240 leading to a constitutional crisis and erosion of
democracy.241
Data collection during surveillance can expand beyond the
response to the virus. A tool designed for one purpose can end up

See U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4; id. amend. XIV, § 1. On the importance of the
right to contest, see Margot E. Kaminski & Jennifer M. Urban, The Right to Consent AI,
121 COLUM. L. REV. 1957, 1957 (2021).
233
See, e.g., Massaro et al., supra note 4, at 258–59.
234
See id. at 247–48.
235
See id. at 242, 259.
236
Id. at 240.
237
Friedman, supra note 33, at 2.
238
Arthur PB Laudrain, Pand-Veillance: COVID-19 Is a Catalyst for Mass Surveillance,
and a Wake-Up Call for Privacy & Transparency 2 (2022) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author).
239
Id.
240
See Lew, supra note 35.
241
See Moshe Maor et al., When COVID-19, Constitutional Crisis, and Political Deadlock
Meet: The Israeli Case from a Disproportionate Policy Perspective, 39 POL’Y & SOC’Y 442, 447–
51 (2020); see generally Jacek Lewkowicz et al., COVID-19 and Erosion of Democracy, 106
ECON. MODELLING (2022).
232
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being used for another one.242 In other words, surveillance can creep
into a larger toolbox243 for future health prevention and control.244 For
example, it can be used for tracking individuals that caught seasonal
flu245 or individuals with unhealthy lifestyles.
The creep of surveillance already exists in the private sector.
Knowledge is power, and knowledge on customers spells out a
potential increase in sales. Governments can collect information and
sell it to third parties, like insurance companies, that can misuse health
information to discriminate against their clients and charge them
differential premiums due to predictions of AI algorithms regarding
their risk.246 Private-sector companies can also misuse the information
to interfere with the process of their decision making, as “[h]uman
information allows control of human behavior by those who have the
know-how to exploit it.”247 Because “surveillance changes [the] power
dynamic between the watcher and the watched” and gives the watcher
power, it can even create risk of blackmail, discrimination, and
coercive persuasion.248 Such information allows companies to nudge,
influence, manipulate, and exploit the watched.249
Moreover, mass surveillance and tracking can become a default.
Governmental agencies may abuse their authority and use the data
collected for illegitimate targeting of individuals for purposes that have
absolutely no connection with public health.250 “The Calcalist” (an
Israeli business daily newspaper) recently reported that Israeli police

Explaining the term “creep” in the related context of censorship, see Danielle
Keats Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship Creep, 93 NORTE DAME
L. REV. 1035, 1050 (2018) (“The term creep refers to ‘the idea that a tool designed for
one purpose ends up being used for another one.’ Tools or programs designed to
accomplish a particular end or to solve a specific problem are gradually extended to
other uses or contexts.”).
243
Tokson & Waldman, supra note 23, at 302 (“[A] camera at a four-way
intersection may have originally been installed to photograph the license plates of
speeders or those who drive through red lights, but it also enables the government to
monitor pedestrians using facial recognition technology.”).
244
See, e.g., id.; KAHN, supra note 8, at 1.
245
See Tokson & Waldman, supra note 23, at 302–03; KAHN, supra note 8, at 1.
246
See Carmel Shachar et al., AI Surveillance During Pandemics: Ethical Implementation
Imperatives, 50 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 18, 20–21 (2020).
247
RICHARDS, supra note 30, at 76.
248
Id. at 134.
249
Id. at 153 (“Data-driven personalized political persuasion is already being
deployed against voters. One of the ways campaigns use data to persuade is through
‘microtargeting.’”).
250
Bradford et al., supra note 7, at 15.
242
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used the notorious NSO spyware to spy on citizens, mayors, political
leaders, and protesters against the government.251 Investigations and
a report by the deputy attorney general (“The Merari report”) found
the allegations to be largely false252 and, recently, the Israeli
government investigators found in the final report that there was no
indication that the police illegally hacked the phones of Israelis
mentioned in the media by using the Pegasus spyware of the Israeli
company NSO Group.253 The investigation, however, found that the
police did use the spyware and gained access to information beyond
the information that the police was allowed to have, such as calendar
entries and phone contact lists.254 Furthermore, the very use of the
spyware is problematic. An order, in accordance with the Israeli
Wiretapping Law,255 does not solve this problem because such orders
allowing for bugging of conversations are unfit to accommodate data
that is not a part of a conversation; therefore, there is no clear legal
basis for using spyware.256 Beyond the NSO scandal, it should be noted
that Israel advances mass collection of information through proposing
a bill that would allow facial recognition cameras in public.257

251
Tomer Ganon, Israel Police Uses NSO’s Pegasus to Spy on Citizens, CALCALIST (Jan.
18, 2022), https://www.calcalistech.com/ctech/articles/0,7340,L-3927410,00.html.
252
Bill to Probe Police Spying Scandal Passes Preliminary Reading in Knesset, ISR. HAYOM
(May 12, 2022, 7:33 AM), https://www.israelhayom.com/2022/05/12/bill-to-probepolice-spying-passes-preliminary-reading-in-knesset.
253
See Chen Maanit, NSO Investigation: Israel Police Exceeded Authority, but Didn’t
Illegally Hack Phones, HAARETZ (Aug 1, 2022) http://ty-article/.premium/nsoinvestigation-israel-police-exceeded-orders-but-didnt-illegally-hack-phones/0000018252de-d438-aba7-52fed7ae0000.
254
Id.
255
§ 10A, Wiretapping Law (Isr.).
256
Yuval Shany, Stay Calm and Proceed with Caution: The Merari Report on Israeli Police’s
Pegasus Scandal, LAWFARE (Aug. 25, 2022), https://www.lawfareblog.com/stay-calmand-proceed-caution-merari-report-israeli-polices-pegasus-scandal
(“The
Merari
report explains that the Wiretapping Law only permits surveillance of communications
in transit, and that permissible monitoring activity pursuant to it must take place in
real time or near real time—namely, it permits interception through surveillance
undertaken in close temporal proximity to the time of the communication in question
and does not permit the tracing back of the historical record of communications of
individuals under surveillance. . . . Indeed, prominent experts in Israeli privacy law
have maintained that given the dramatic impact of such technology on the right to
privacy, the police cannot justify the utilization of spyware on the basis of existing
legislation developed with much less intrusive technology in mind.”).
257
Noa Shpigel, Israel Advances Use of Face-Recognition Cameras in Public, HAARETZ
(May 9, 2022), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-advances-useof-face-recognition-cameras-in-public-1.10787476.
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Mass surveillance, collection, and analysis of data already takes
place and can infringe on freedom of speech and the right of
For example, they can be used for collecting
association.258
information on political activists.259 Such mass collection can be used
to target political opponents and quarantine them at the time of antigovernment protests. Governments can justify this action by reasoning
that they had been exposed to a COVID-19 carrier and should be
isolated for public health protection, regardless of whether they were
actually exposed to an infected person. The use of facial recognition
technology can also extend beyond combating the virus. Such
technology can be used to stop resistance against governments,
oppress protests, arrest people that participate in demonstrations, and
infringe on human rights.260 Such systems can even analyze faces and
draw insight on emotional expressions and personality traits.261
Further, the fact that Microsoft decided to limit the use of their facialrecognition systems by refusing to sell them to police departments
until passage of a federal law regulating the technology proves the
technology’s risks.262 Moreover, the EU’s recently proposed regulation
regarding the use of AI even bans real-time remote biometric
identification in public places because such identification poses a high
risk to liberties.263 Data collection and analysis allows for accurate

258

On mass surveillance and the right of association, see Friedman, supra note 33,

at 31.
See, e.g., Eder Campuzano, Homeland Security Characterizes Portland’s Anti-Trump
Riot as ‘Terrorist Violence:’ Report, OREGONIAN (Mar. 3, 2017, 2:25 AM),
https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/2017/03/homeland_security_calls_portland
_trump_riot_domestic_terrorist_violence.html; Friedman, supra note 33, at 37.
260
Eldar Haber, Racial Recognition, 43 CARDOZO L. REV. 71, 100 (2021) (“[B]oth
Miami police and the NYPD used facial recognition to track down Black Lives Matter
activists.”); see also Kate Cox, Cops in Miami, NYC Arrest Protesters from Facial Recognition
Matches, ARSTECHNICA (Aug. 19, 2020, 4:45 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy
/2020/08/cops-in-miami-nyc-arrest-protesters-from-facial-recognition-matches.
261
KATE CRAWFORD, ATLAS OF AI 154 (2021).
262
See Jay Greene, Following Amazon and IBM, Microsoft Won’t Sell Police Its FacialRecognition Tech, SPOKESMAN-REV. (June 11, 2020), https://www.spokesman.com
/stories/2020/jun/11/following-amazon-and-ibm-microsoft-wont-sell-polic.
263
Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
Laying Down Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act), art.
5(1)(d), COM (2021) 206 final (Apr. 21, 2021). For further information, see Denise
Almeida et al., The Ethics of Facial Recognition Technologies, Surveillance, and Accountability
in an Age of Artificial Intelligence: a Comparative Analysis of US, EU, and UK Regulatory
Frameworks, 2 AI & ETHICS 377 (2022); Margot E. Kaminski, Regulating the Risks of AI,
103 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2023) (at 49–54), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4195066.
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targeting of individuals that are prone to supporting the government,
influencing their consciousness, and manipulating them to advocate
for a specific candidate on an election cycle and even volunteer in the
campaign. Much like Cambridge Analytica, a company that developed
the model for predicting the behavior of voters and targeting political
messages,264 governments can abuse surveillance to influence voters
instead of preserving the public’s health.
“Exceptional circumstances are political windows of opportunity
for deploying new surveillance tools and practices . . . .”265
“Governments that have acquired new powers to monitor and control
their citizenry to meet a temporary need are loathed to give them
up.”266 “For example, shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the
[United States], its government passed the USA Patriot Act of 2001,
giving it ‘temporary surveillance powers.’”267 Almost two decades later,
“the [United States] government has retained most of these powers.”268
Moreover, the National Security Agency (NSA) has been gathering
records of online sexual activities and visits to pornographic websites
“as part of a proposed plan to harm the reputations of those whom the
agency believes are radicalizing others through incendiary
speeches.”269 The NSA wanted to surveil “radicalizers” who are not
terrorists, “but merely radical critics of U.S. policy.”270 “It also raises
troubling questions about the government’s ability and willingness to
blackmail its critics for nothing more than sincerely speaking on core
matters of political speech protected by the First Amendment.”271
“In the digital age, privacy against the state remains an essential
part of political freedom.”272 As history can repeat itself, mass
surveillance can continue on the axis of time even when the risk of
See Carole Cadwalladr & Emma Graham-Harrison, Revealed: 50 Million Facebook
Profiles Harvested for Cambridge Analytica in Major Data Breach, GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2018,
6:03 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analyticafacebook-influence-us-election.
265
Laudrain, supra note 238, at 2.
266
See Andrew Urbaczewski & Young Jin Lee, Information Technology and the
Pandemic: A Preliminary Multinational Analysis of the Impact of Mobile Tracking Technology
on the COVID-19 Contagion Control, 29 EUR. J. INFO. SYS. 405, 410 (2020).
267
See id.
268
See id.
269
Glenn Greenwald & Ryan Grim, Top-Secret Document Reveals NSA Spied on Porn
Habits as Part of Plan to Discredit ‘Radicalizers’, HUFFPOST (Nov. 26, 2013, 11:20 PM),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/nsa-porn-muslims_n_4346128.
270
RICHARDS, supra note 30, at 131.
271
Id. at 132.
272
Id. at 133.
264
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health due to COVID-19 is over. The danger of such surveillance
practices, in both democratic societies and others, is that they do not
roll back once the emergency is over. In fact, the “pandemic industry”
that magnifies the crisis can lead to permanent changes in the statecitizen relationship, as a strong state response requires new powers and
resources that persist in the post-crisis period. “[T]he costs of
government responses to health crises are often long lasting, variable,
and unseen meaning that the overall costs of government responses
will tend to be understated.” 273
The erosion of democracy is expected to become much worse
with the possibilities of surveillance that can transit from “over the
skin” and focus on what we do, where we go, who we meet to “under
the skin” by using technologies that can reveal what happens inside
our body—our body temperature, blood pressure, heart rate, and even
how we feel.274 This technology became a reality. In Sweden,
thousands have already inserted microchips into their hands, aiming
to use them “to speed up users’ daily routines.”275 For example,
microchips allow for fast access to the office building without using a
badge, buying food at the cafeteria, or gaining secure access to the
computer at work.276 As microchips develop, they might be able to
evaluate physical body measurements and not only store
information.277 Even before microchips, the growing use of the
Internet of Things (IoT) technologies enabled unprecedented
Christopher J. Coyne & Yuliya Yatsyshina, Pandemic Police States, 26 PEACE ECON.,
PEACE SCI. & PUB. POL’Y, Sept. 2020, at 4.
274
See Anna Carthaus, The Biggest Danger is not the Virus Itself, DW (Apr. 22, 2020),
https://www.dw.com/en/virus-itself-is-not-the-biggest-danger-says-yuval-noah-harari
/a-53195552.
275
See Ahmed Banafa, Technology Under Your Skin: 3 Challenges of Microchip Implants,
BBVA: OPENMIND (Apr. 5, 2021), https://www.bbvaopenmind.com/en/technology
/innovation/technology-under-your-skin; Mandi Heshmati, COVID-19: In Sweden, a
Vaccine Passport on a Microchip Implant, FR. 24 (Dec. 21, 2021, 4:22 PM),
https://www.france24.com/en/video/20211221-covid-19-in-sweden-a-vaccinepassport-on-a-microchip-implant.
276
See Rachel Metz, This Company Embeds Microchips In Its Employees, and They Love It,
MIT TECH. REV. (Aug 17, 2018) https://www.technologyreview.com/2018/08/17
/140994/this-company-embeds-microchips-in-its-employees-and-they-love-it;
A.
Spender et. al, Wearables and the Internet of Things: Considerations for the Life and Health
Insurance Industry, 24 BRIT. ACTUARIAL J. 1, 23 (2019) (“Sweden has already offered
microchips to employees of the start-up companies based there, and people did
volunteer. The chips allow employees to unlock doors, operate printers, open storage
lockers and even buy smoothies with the wave of a hand.”).
277
Spender et. al, supra note 276 (“The ability of chip implants to start tracking and
measuring health stats on a large scale is closer than we think.”).
273
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invasive surveillance on a scale like never before.278 Biometric
information, collected by sensors in such devices, can tell governments
far more about individuals than ever before. Traditional technological
surveillance focused on monitoring actions in the world—where an
individual goes, who he meets, and so on. Governments, however,
have become more interested in what is happening inside the body
and brain.279 By using our growing understanding of the human body
and brain, combined with the immense powers of machine learning,
governments in the future might be able to “hack” the human body
and gain knowledge on citizens’ authentic feelings and emotions. A
person could smile and clap his hands mechanically, but if he is
actually angry, the government will know.280
Every step of state surveillance to combat COVID-19 leads to
another and can creep to other areas of life in a slippery slope,
cascading into a significant negative effect that erodes democracy.
Right now, going under the skin,281 at the service of “the thought
police”—the agency which knows everything about a person and
punishes them for a thought crime—seems similar to the Orwellian
dystopia.282 The idea of microchips under the skin, however, is already
a reality. Sweden has even employed microchips loaded with citizens’
COVID-19 vaccination certificates.283 Governments are starting to
paddle towards such ideas of going under the skin in related contexts.
For example, Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s former Prime Minister,
proposed to “microchip” children who returned to schools and
kindergartens as the COVID-19 lockdown was lifted, in an effort to
ensure social distancing.284 Experts slammed this proposal as
unenforceable, inefficient, and risky, citing the potential misuse of
278
Marie-Helen Maras et al., Enabling Mass Surveillance: Data Aggregation in the Age of
Big Data and the Internet of Things, 4 J. CYBER POL’Y 160 (2019) (explaining that the
Internet of Things “facilitates perpetual surveillance of populations. This form of
surveillance is made possible because IoT devices record and transmit a massive
amount of data that is being shared and analysed in new and unique ways to enable
the ubiquitous monitoring of individuals.”).
279
See Lew, supra note 35.
280
Id.
281
Harari, The World After Coronavirus, supra note 6 (referring to under-the-skin
surveillance).
282
GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 12 (1949); see generally Varun Chikale, 1984 – George Orwell,
2 JUS CORPUS L.J. 29 (2022) (book review).
283
See Heshmati, supra note 275.
284
Leon Sverdlov, Benjamin Netanyahu Suggests Microchipping Kids, Slammed by Experts,
JERUSALEM POST (May 8, 2020, 2:46 PM), https://www.jpost.com/israel-news
/benjamin-netanyahu-suggests-to-microchip-kids-slammed-by-experts-627381.
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children’s personal information.285 The fact that such an Orwellian
idea was even proposed demonstrates that the dystopic future
described in 1984286 may already be here.
During times of crisis, citizens are distracted, scared, and “more
at the mercy of their leaders. Too often, that ends up being a bad
combination for democracy.”287 Such exigent circumstances “are
taken advantage of to impose new norms that would never have been
tolerated by the citizenry in less exceptional times.”288
V. ENJOYING HEALTH AND PREVENTING THE EROSION OF CIVIL RIGHTS
AND LIBERTIES
Privacy is a fundamental right. In the EU Charter of Fundamental
Human Rights (ECHR), Article 7 (entitled “Respect for Private and
Family Life”) proclaims that “[e]veryone has the right to respect for
his or her private and family life, home and communications.”289
“Article 8 of the Charter (entitled ‘Protection of Personal Data’)
introduced a new categorical recognition of the rights to data privacy
by stating that ‘Everyone has the right to the protection of personal
data concerning him or her.’”290
Many EU Member States, however, introduced states of
emergency to respond to the COVID-19 crisis, which allowed certain
rights to be limited.291 Several EU Member States additionally made
new declarations of states of emergency, while others prolonged states

Id.
See ORWELL, supra note 282, at 5. For further information on the dystopia of
surveillance, see Jon Miltimore, The Origins of the Thought Police—and Why They Scare Us,
FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC.: STORIES (Nov. 15, 2019), https://fee.org/articles/theorigins-of-the-thought-police-and-why-they-scare-us.
287
VELIZ, supra note 62, at 202–10.
288
Id. at 185.
289
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Oct. 26, 2012,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT (last
visited Oct. 6, 2022).
290
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 8; Federico
Fabbrini, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Rights to Data Privacy: The EU Court
of Justice as a Human Rights Court, in THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AS A
BINDING INSTRUMENT: FIVE YEARS OLD AND GROWING 261, 267 (Sybe de Vries, Ulf
Bernitz, & Stephen Weatherill eds., 2015).
291
EUR. PARL. RSCH. SERV., STATES OF EMERGENCY IN RESPONSE TO THE CORONAVIRUS
CRISIS
(2020),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020
/659385/EPRS_STU(2020)659385_EN.pdf (explaining such states of emergency
ranges were “generally renewable. The legislation underpinning the declared states
of emergency allowed governments to restrict fundamental rights”).
285
286
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of emergency that were declared earlier when the virus started to
spread. “Around a third of EU Member States extended existing states
of emergency” as the spread of the virus continued in early 2020.292
In resemblance to the EU, the United States protection against
state surveillance is also a constitutional right.
The Fourth
Amendment protects people from warrantless searches.293 Under
exigent circumstances, however, a warrant is unfeasible.294 Thus, for
many public health purposes, strict adherence to a warrant regime may
not be required. Any disease surveillance program is likely to be
evaluated under the Fourth Amendment’s special needs doctrine (also
called the “administrative search doctrine”), by which courts
sometimes permit warrantless surveillance.295 This might happen if
getting a warrant would be impracticable, the search is aimed at
something other than a traditional law enforcement purpose, and the
search is considered reasonable.296 In their battle against the virus,
however, governments collect information on individuals without
suspicion that the individual has contracted the virus.297 “A robust
contact tracing program would thus raise constitutional concerns . . .
.”298 Yet even in the United States, courts tend to give the government
much more leeway in emergencies.299 A pandemic is likely to be
treated similarly, especially at the beginning when there is less
information and courts have little basis to question government
representations about necessity or effectiveness. “On the other hand,
emergency powers are not limitless.”300
EUR. UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RTS., CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC IN THE EU –
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS: WITH A FOCUS ON CONTACT-TRACING APPS 8 (2020),
http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2020-coronaviruspandemic-eu-bulletin-may_en.pdf.
293
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012);
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018).
294
Rozenshtein, supra note, supra note 34.
295
See Friedman, supra note 33, at 34–35
296
Rozenshtein, supra note 34, at 1541 (2021); Friedman, supra note 33, at 34 &
n.185 (referring to Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)); Geoffrey S. Corn,
Deterring Illegal Firearms in the Community: Special Needs, Special Problems, and Special
Limitations, 43 CARDOZO L. REV. 1515, 1530–31 (2022).
297
Rozenshtein, supra note 34, at 1520.
298
Rozenshtein, supra note 32.
299
Id.
300
Id. (expanding on the safeguards that can be built into emergency powers that
might limit abuse, “courts may give the government more leeway when the action is
taken pursuant to a formal invocation of emergency, especially the legislature ratifies
it. Sunset clauses (as in the United Kingdom’s recently enacted Coronavirus Act) can
provide an assurance that emergency powers will not be permanent. Transparency as
292
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So, must people choose between civil rights and health? This Part
argues no. The legitimate end of protecting health should be pursued
by using rational means. The means must be reasonably tailored to
the legitimate end of protecting health while avoiding over- or underinclusion and minimizing damage, such as chilling effect on speech,
infringement of intellectual privacy, discrimination, and stigma.301
With the right design, safeguards, transparency, due process, and
oversight, both civil rights and public health may be served, thereby
avoiding the erosion of democracy. The following subsections focus
on measures to protect civil rights while also protecting health and
preventing the rise of the surveillance state.
A. Privacy (and Other Values)-By-Design
In recent years, there has been an increasing use of technologybased solutions to prevent the infliction of privacy harm. Studies
emphasize “the power of architecture to account for human values and
technology user rights ‘in a principled and comprehensive manner
throughout the design process,”302 for example, by implementing the
approach of “Value Sensitive Design that identifies human needs and
values and needs and takes them into account in the design process.”303
Engineers make decisions that can unleash new technologies that the
legislature did not foresee, decisions that may affect fundamental
rights. Scholarly work has already explored the influence of
technological governance systems and their potential to protect
to how the program is operating can increase accountability to the general public and
civil society watchdog groups. And, above all, the emergency response must be limited
to what is necessary to deal with the emergency; courts will (or at least should) examine
the government program for ‘surveillance creep.’”).
301
Massaro et al., supra note 4, at 242, 246; see also Lee, supra note 123, at 23
(referring to “(i) the legitimacy of the purpose, (ii) the adequacy of the method for
achieving the goal, (iii) the minimum of damage, and (iv) the balance of legal interests
between the public interest to be protected by the legislation and the fundamental
right to be infringed.”).
302
Michal Lavi, Publish, Share, Re-Tweet, and Repeat, 54 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 441, 494
(2021) (quoting Deirdre K Mulligan & Jenifer King, Bridging the Gap Between Privacy
and Design, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 989, 1019 (2012) (quoting Batya Friedman et al.,
DEP’T OF COMPUT. SCI. & ENG’G, UNIV. OF WASH., CSE TECHNICAL REPORT NO. 02-12-01,
VALUE SENSITIVE DESIGN: THEORY AND METHODS (2002)).
303
Id. at 494 n.351 (2021) (quoting Michal Lavi, Do Platforms Kill?, 43 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 477, 553 n.504 (2020) (citing Noemi Manders-Huits & Jeroen van den
Hove, The Need for Value-Sensitive Design of Communication Infrastructures, in EVALUATING
NEW TECHNOLOGIES 51, 54–55 (Paul Sollie & Marcus Duwell eds., 2009); see, e.g.,
Deirdre K Mulligan & Jenifer King, Bridging the Gap Between Privacy and Design, 14 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 989 (2012).
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privacy.304 This concept of privacy-by-design was developed into a
philosophy that focuses on ex ante regulation of the technological
design instead of ex post remedies.305 Researchers have described how
to make privacy-protective features, a core part of functionality, and
how to accommodate threats to privacy.306 Regulators around the
world have discovered the benefits of privacy-by-design. In discovering
these benefits, the regulators have set forth guidelines and promoted
legal regulations that include privacy-by-design and have made efforts
to incentivize stakeholders to adopt this approach as part of their
business models.307
A central example is Article 25 of the EU Data Protection
Regulation (“GDPR”) which addresses “[d]ata protection by design
and default.”308 Article 25 advocates for building privacy-friendly

See, e.g., ANDY CRABTREE ET AL., PRIVACY BY DESIGN FOR THE INTERNET OF THINGS:
BUILDING ACCOUNTABILITY AND SECURITY (2021). Eric Everson, Privacy by Design: Taking
Ctrl
of
Big
Data,
65
CLEV.
ST.
L.
REV.
27
(2017),
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/cgi
/viewcontent.cgi?article=3933&context=clevstlrev; Ira S. Rubinstein, Regulating Privacy
by Design, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1409, 1419, 1422 (2011); Woodrow Hartzog &
Frederic Stutzman, Obscurity by Design, 88 WASH. L. REV. 385, 418 (2013).
305
Privacy by design is an approach that incorporates thinking about privacy
protective features and implementing them as early as possible. See HOOFNAGLE, supra
note 38, at 190–92 (2016); BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, supra note 38, at 32, 178;
CAVOUKIAN, supra note 38, at 3.
306
See Ira S. Rubinstein, Regulating Privacy by Design, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1409,
1419, 1422 (2011); Hartzog & Stutzman, Obscurity by Design, supra note 304, at 418
(referring to a narrow approach to privacy (obscurity of data) and overview of
strategies to protect privacy by design); Serge Egelman et al., Timing Is Everything? The
Effects of Timing and Placement of Online Privacy Indicators, in CHI ’09: PROCS. OF THE
SIGCHI CONF. ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYS. 319, 319 (2009).
307
See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 22–30 (2012),
http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf; HOOFNAGLE, supra note 38, at
191 (“[t]he FTC is embracing [privacy by design]”); see also Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data
Protection in the European Union, at 12, COM (2010) 609 final (Nov. 4, 2010); Lilian
Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm? Why A ‘Right to an Explanation’ is
Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking For, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18, 77 (2017).
308
Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 25, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 48 (EU). The
General Data Protection Regulation that came into force in 2018 subjects “controllers”
to a broader right to erasure. Id. art. 17, at 43–44. See also Edwards & Veale, supra note
307, at 77; Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Towards a Global Data Privacy
Standard, 71 FLA. L. REV. 365, 419–20 (2019).
304
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systems starting at the beginning of the design process.309 Accordingly,
controllers of data must implement “appropriate technical and
organizational measures” to protect the rights of data subjects, both at
the stage of system development as well as at the stage of actual
processing. In particular, “data protection by default” is required so
that only personal data necessary for processing are gathered. “Typical
implementations of [privacy] by design and data protection by design
are the anonymi[z]ation and pseudonymization of personal data, a
data minimi[z]ation approach during processing and storing data,
storage limitation, transparency regarding processing, and limited
access to personal data.”310 The GDPR’s “principle-based approach
offers a functional blueprint for system design that is compatible with
fundamental rights.”311
By contrast, in the United States, sector-specific rules are much
narrower. For example, the U.S. Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) “applies only to data collected by health
providers themselves, or businesses hired by health providers to
process their data.”312 “An individual’s diagnosis from a diagnostic lab
would, therefore, be subject to HIPAA[]. . . but a Bluetooth exposure
proximity system falls completely outside HIPAA’s parameters.”313
Moreover, in the battle against COVID-19, the Department of Health
and Human Services (“HHS”) is exercising discretion in how HIPAA
“[a]llow[s] [u]ses and [d]isclosures of [p]rotected [h]ealth

309
Edwards & Veale, supra note 307, at 77 (explaining that by doing so, it
“recognize[s] that a regulator cannot do everything by top down control, but that
controllers must themselves be involved in the design of” systems that minimize
invasion of privacy).
310
Oliver Vettermann, Self-Made Data Protecton – Is it Enough? Prevention and Aftercare of Identity Theft, 10 EUR. J.L. & TECH. 1, 9 (2019); see Edwards & Veale, supra note
307, at 77.
311
Bradford et al., supra note 7, at 1.
312
Id. at 9–10 (citing HIPAA § 262(a); Standards for Privacy of Individually
Identifiable Health Information, 64 FED. REG. at 59,918); see Neil Richards & Woodrow
Hartzog, A Duty of Loyalty for Privacy Law, 99 WASH. U. L. REV. 961, 1001–02 (2021)
(“HIPAA’s main problem is that it does not apply to a broad enough category of
relationships. Thus, it does not protect disclosed data outside of ‘covered entities’ or
their ‘business associates.’”).
313
Bradford et al., supra note 7, at 1 (citing Carmel Shachar, Protecting Privacy in
Digital Contact Tracing for COVID-19: Avoiding a Regulatory Patchwork, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG
(May 19, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200515.190582
/full.
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[i]nformation by [b]usiness [a]ssociates for [p]ublic [h]ealth,”
including transferring the information to third parties.314
Although HIPPA’s protection of personal data is relatively
narrower than the GDPR, the GDPR has a long-arm jurisdictional
reach. The GDPR protects data of EU citizens, yet also applies to nonEU companies that offer goods or services to EU consumers. Thus, it
can also affect data protection in the U.S. and throughout the world.315
The GDPR also contains a threshold test for “international transfers of
personal data” to non-member states and a legal basis for blocking data
exports to states that do not meet this standard.316 The threshold for
extraterritorial transmissions is the “adequacy” of data protection in the
foreign jurisdiction.317 Instead of an adequacy determination, the EU
and United States have reached an agreed called “Privacy Shield”— a
voluntary private sector program—for transmissions to the United
States.318 This bilateral agreement presented a list of “substantive EU
principles for American companies to follow voluntarily.”319 Yet, the

314
See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Notification of Enforcement Discretion under
HIPAA to Allow Uses and Disclosures of Protected Health Information by Business Associates for
Public Health and Health Oversight Activities in Response to COVID-19, www.hhs.gov/sites
/default/files/notification-enforcement-discretion-hipaa.pdf (last visited Oct. 10,
2022).
315
Paul M. Schwartz, Global Data Privacy: The EU Way, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 771, 810
(2019) (“[The EU’s] power in this regard first developed in response to issues that it
faced internally. It needed to harmonize the data processing practices of EU member
states. The inward-facing elements of EU data protection law then became an
important factor in its adaptability to the rest of the world. Here is a global diffusion
story that begins with a response to internal political considerations.”).
316
See Anupam Chander et al., Catalyzing Privacy Law, 105 MINN. L. REV. 1733, 1739
(2021); Schwartz, supra note 315, at 774.
317
See Schwartz, supra note 315, at 785 (“In Article 45, the GDPR requires that the
Commission consider a long list of factors in assessing the adequacy of protection,
including ‘the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,
relevant legislation, both general and sectoral, . . . as well as the implementation of
such legislation, data protection rules, professional rules and security measures.’”).
318
The privacy shield replaced the safe haven agreement. In Schrems v. Data
Protection Commissioner, the ECJ declared that this safe harbor was invalid. Case C-362
/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, ECLI:EU:2015:650, ¶ 216 (June 10, 2015).
Following this decision, the United States and the European Union reached a new
arrangement called the Privacy Shield. It should be noted that the legal future remains
uncertain and is dependent on the outcome of another ruling by the CJEU. See Case
C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir. Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2019:1145, ¶ 44–45
(July 16, 2015); The Schrems Saga Continues: Schrems II Case Heard Before the CJEU,
HUNTON PRIV. BLOG (July 10, 2019), https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2019/07
/10/the-schrems-saga-continues-schrems-ii-case-heard-before-the-cjeu.
319
Schwartz, supra note 315, at 795; Schrems, ECLI:EU:2015:650, at ¶ 17.
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European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Luxembourg recently struck down
the privacy shield in Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland.320
The court determined that the Privacy Shield agreement did not limit
access to data by U.S. authorities “in a way that satisfies requirements
that are essentially equivalent to those required under EU law.”321 The
principles of the GDPR have global impact today, more than ever, and
can influence the engineering of privacy outside of Europe.322
Adopting the concept of privacy-by-design will allow the industry and
policy makers to adhere to cross jurisdictional legal standards and
prevent the relinquishing of the right to privacy.
Inserting privacy and security safeguards into the architecture of
technology builds protection into the design rather than counting on
responsible use alone. Focusing on the design maximizes public
health while respecting and promoting other values323 as well as
reducing the arising harm ex ante.324 Adopting the concept of privacyby-design will not only protect the right to privacy, it will also promote
civil rights and prevent the erosion of democracy. The following
subsection will overview a few models of surveillance used to combat
COVID-19. It will demonstrate how privacy-by-design could protect
health, values of privacy, and make it difficult for the surveillance state
to rise.

See Data Prot. Comm’r, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, at ¶342.
Id. See also Victoria Neiazy, Invalidation of the EU–US Privacy Shield: impact on Data
Protection and Data Security Regarding the Transfer of Personal Data to the United States, 2
INT. CYBERSECURITY L. REV. 27, 28 (2021) (“[T]he Privacy Shield is no longer a valid
transfer basis. According to the CJEU companies can still base their transfer on
standard contractual clauses (SCCs) or other transfer tools under Article 46 of the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), but will have to review in each case
whether this is sufficient. If that is not the case, they need to apply additional
supplementary measures.”).
322
See Beata A. Safari, Intangible Privacy Rights: How Europe’s GDPR Will Set a New
Global Standard for Personal Data Protection, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 809, 816–20 (2017);
Schwartz, supra note 315, at 777–78.
323
Deirdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A. Bamberger, Saving Governance-By-Design, 106
CALIF. L. REV. 697, 721 (2018); Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy’s Law of Design, U.C. IRVINE
L. REV. 1239, 1242 (2019) (“Design’s significant, yet invisible, capacity to manipulate
those who exist inside its ecosystem requires us to consider the values we want design
to promote.”).
324
ALI ET AL., supra note 8, at 50–53.
320
321
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1. Smartphone Contact Surveillance
i. Compulsory Surveillance—No Privacy, No Trust
In their battle against COVID-19, states used cell phone location
data to track population movement because when the outbreak of the
virus started, governments believed it would reduce the infection rate.
By doing so, they violated the right to privacy because surveillance can
reveal information on a person’s health, location, contacts, and allow
for drawing conclusions on their interpersonal connections. When
health information, as well as information of location and interactions,
is transferred between a government and the respective department of
health and human services without their consent, the infrastructure of
the surveillance tool and architecture does not consider the value of
privacy. A prominent example of this practice is the mandatory
surveillance of the Shin Bet Israel’s Security Agency (ISA) in Israel,
which tracks location data from mobile phones that the Israeli
government collected and used without consent.325 Such a locationbased tracking system collects huge amounts of information and keeps
it without considering principles of data minimization326 and privacy in
the design. Thus, this model promotes the rise of the surveillance
state.
ii. GPS Location-Based Surveillance—the Model of Israel
Ministry of Health “HaMagen”—One Step Further in
Privacy Protection
In addition to compulsory government surveillance tools, the
Ministry of Health in Israel launched “HaMagen” (“The Shield”).327
Such a voluntary app was one step closer to privacy-by-design but is still
inferior to Bluetooth-based contact tracing apps, to be discussed
below. This app was based on GPS smartphone location. The app had
325
See Bandel, supra note 92; KAHN, supra note 8, at 37 (“Israel also implemented a
centralized involuntary data collection system for tracking COVID-19 cases and
alerting those who may have been exposed.”); see generally Shaul A. Duke, Understanding
the Apathy Towards the Israeli Security Agency’s COVID-19 Surveillance, 19 SURVEILLANCE
& SOC’Y 114 (2021).
326
For the obligation of data minimization under E.U. Law, see Regulation 2016
/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of Apr. 2016 on the protection
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation) 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, art. 5 [hereinafter GDPR].
327
Press Release, The Ministry of Health, The Ministry of Health Launches
“HAMAGEN” - an App to Prevent the Spread of Coronavirus (Mar. 22, 2020),
https://www.gov.il/en/departments/news/2203202004.
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an open code, which enabled transparency and inspection for
everyone to see that the declarations of the Ministry of Health
regarding avoiding collection of information were kept.328 HaMagen
obtained and compared, but did not share, location data from users’
phones with a central server that contained the location histories of
confirmed cases—no data was shared before diagnosis. The diagnosed
users, however, “will be notified and given the option of reporting their
exposure to the Health Ministry by filling out a form; subsequently,
their location trails are released to public.”329 Tracking location is
dangerous for privacy purposes because a person’s location can tell a
lot about them. Although HaMagen only processed users’ location
data on their smartphone devices, the system relied on pushing the
location data of all infected users within the Israeli government servers
to all users in the system. Thus, there was a centralized element of
stored information on the routes of infected people. Hence, the
location data of infected people was not protected, as “it expose[d]
infected individuals to re-identification risk by pushing their identifiers
to all edge devices for local matching.”330
iii. The Apple/Google Bluetooth Contact Tracing App:
Applying Privacy-by-Design
A third model is contact tracing apps, which are based on
Bluetooth proximity exposure notification. The best example is the
planned Google/Apple Contact Tracing App for exposure notification
services.331 The Google/Apple app allowed iPhone or Android devices
to detect other devices that had been within a certain distance for a
significant duration. That “handshake” causes unique identifier codes
to be stored, in an encrypted form, on both devices.332 If someone
subsequently tested positive for COVID-19, that person uploaded
information centrally to an app server together with their unique

328
Press Release, The Ministry of Health, Israel: Ministry of Health launches
HaMagen 2 Contact Tracing App, (July 28, 2020), https://www.dataguidance.com
/news/israel-ministry-health-launches-hamagen-2-contact.
329
See RUOXI SUN ET AL., VETTING SECURITY AND PRIVACY OF GLOBAL COVID-19
CONTACT TRACING APPLICATIONS 3 (2020), arxiv.org/abs/2006.10933.
330
See DAVID STURZENEGGER ET AL., CONFIDENTIAL COMPUTING FOR PRIVACYPRESERVING CONTACT TRACING 2 (2020), arxiv.org/abs/2006.14235.
331
Privacy-Preserving
Contact
Tracing,
APPLE,
www.apple.com/covid19
/contacttracing (last visited Oct. 6, 2022).
332
See Exposure Notification, APPLE/GOOGLE (Apr. 2020), https://covid19-static.cdnapple.com/applications/covid19/current/static/contact-tracing/pdf
/ExposureNotification-BluetoothSpecificationv1.2.pdf; KAHN , supra note 8, at 37–38.

544

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:491

identifier codes. The app “download[ed] positive diagnosis identifier
codes daily and . . . match[ed] them with codes stored on individual
devices.” 333 A match generated an automatic notification from the app
that appeared on any device that recorded the infected individual’s
device identifier(s) during the relevant time period. Information
about exposure events largely stayed on each user’s phone, while the
central server processed only “de-identified” information about
individuals with a positive diagnosis.334 The decentralized architecture
of the app ensured continued adherence to a high standard of privacy
and security.335 There was anonymization of information and no data
retention on a central server, which safeguarded government abuses
of the information.336 Standards of privacy-by-design were also more
likely to be in line with data protection laws.
In the United States, HIPAA337 applies only to data collected by
health providers themselves or businesses hired by health providers to
process their data. Google and Apple’s Bluetooth exposure proximity
system fell outside of HIPAA’s parameters.338 A Google/Apple app,
however, could not escape the long-arm limitations and restrictions
posed by the EU’s GDPR.339 This regulation is relevant to the United
States because it extends to non-EU companies that offer goods or
services to EU consumers. It applies to personal data that has “any
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person.”340
GDPR limitations and restrictions apply to “personal data” that is “any
Bradford et al., supra note 7, at 3; KAHN, supra note 8, at 38.
Robert Gellman, The Deidentification Dilemma: A Legislative and Contractual
Proposal, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 33–35 (2010). (explaining that
“deidentification means that personal information has been processed in some fashion
to reduce the ability to identify the individuals to whom the data refer”); Bradford et
al., supra note 7, at 3 (“Information about exposure events largely stays on each user’s
phone, while the central server and ENS process only ‘de-identified’ information
about individuals with a positive diagnosis.”).
335
See Ronald L. Rivest et al., PACT: Private Automated Contact Tracing, MASS. INST.
TECH. (May 19, 2020), pact.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/PACT-Missionand-Approach-2020-05-19-.pdf.
336
See Urbaczewski & Lee, supra note 266, at 406 (explaining that without
safeguards “[i]t is also not clear if the data collected would be protected from other
uses by other government agencies”). On data retention and privacy, see generally
Alexander Tsesis, Data Subjects’ Privacy Rights: Regulation of Personal Data Retention and
Erasure, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 593, 602 (2019).
337
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (1996).
338
Bradford et al., supra note 7, at 7.
339
See generally sources cited supra note 308.
340
GDPR art. 4(1).
333
334
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information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person.”341
If, however, anonymization is fully achieved, the data does not relate
to an identified person anymore.342 “Apple and Google claim that user
data broadcasted through their app has been ‘anonymized’ by virtue
of deidentification and decentralization.”343 If the goal of full
anonymization is achieved, the data subject is no longer identifiable,
and Google/Apple apps are not subjected to data protection
obligations under the GDPR. Data anonymization, however, “is a very
high bar and data controllers often fall short of actually anonymizing
data.”344 Information is considered anonymized, and outside of the
reach of the GDPR, only if the information cannot be associated with
a natural individual, taking into account the means reasonably likely
to be used, including the available technology at the time of the
processing and other technological developments.345 Yet, as more
technologies of de-anonymization develop, “users can never be
confident that data shared ‘anonymously’ will not be associated with
them in the future.”346
“Data controllers equally cannot be sure that they will not be
found liable for failing to protect de-identified data.”347 Therefore,
although Google and Apple anonymize the data processed through
the app, “they have still instituted multiple controls to prevent reidentification in their design, in keeping with the GDPR’s data
minimisation and security of processing principles.”348 “These controls
result in data that is at least pseudonymized.”349 If the data is only
pseudonymized, controllers of the data will be required to implement
appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure that
processing is performed in accordance with the GDPR.350 They can
still benefit, however, from several relaxed standards under the
Id.
See GDPR Recital 26.
343
Bradford et al., supra note 7, at 7 (referencing Zach Whitaker & Darrell
Etherington, Q&A: Apple and Google Discuss Their Coronavirus Tracing Efforts,
TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 13, 2020), https://techcrunch.com/2020/04/13/apple-googlecoronavirus-tracing).
344
Id.
345
GDPR Recital 26.
346
Bradford et al., supra note 7, at 7.
347
Id.
348
Id.
349
Id.
350
GDPR art. 5(1)(b) (expanding on Principles relating to processing of personal
data); Hadar Y. Jabotinsky and Michal Lavi, Speak Out: Verifying and Unmasking
Cryptocurrency User Identity, 32 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 518, 589(2022).
341
342
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GDPR351 but will bear costs in complying with the GDPR standards as
controllers of the information.
In summary, privacy by design makes the need to choose between
health and privacy redundant. In the context of contact tracing apps,
adhering to high standards of privacy allows app operators to avoid
violations of privacy and data protection laws and promotion of the
surveillance state.
2. Privacy by Design: From Individuals to Network-Tracking
Diffusion of COVID-19
Mapping, identifying, and predicting areas of outbreak on the
network, as well as visualizing the pattern of the spread of COVID-19,
might allow for more accurate control measures.352 As charts and
graphs are open to everyone’s analysis, everybody is able to measure,
calculate, model, and interpret them. Such modeling might develop
research on the spread of the virus, identifying trends and preparing
adequate reaction. The information collected on individuals is used
for understanding the diffusion of the virus in general.
Much like contact tracing apps, however, mapping, identifying,
and predicting areas of outbreak should not be at the price of privacy
and should not promote a surveillance state. Researchers can map the
diffusion of the virus without using identifying information. A privacyby-design approach might allow governments to take efficient steps to
prevent damages to public health and preserve privacy. Anonymizing
private information of specific infected people by virtue of deidentification could achieve the goals of both governments and
citizens in regards to public health and privacy.353 Indeed, there is
always a risk of re-identification and abuse of information by
governments and third parties, despite efforts to prevent it. Yet even
though the risk still exists, efficient anonymization increases the price
of re-identification and reduces the risk for it.354 Engineers and
351
GDPR art. 6(4)(e) (referring to processing for other compatible purposes that
can be allowed for pseudonymized data.). Bradford et al., supra note 7, at 7. (“By
implementing pseudonymization as a security of processing measure, data controllers
can benefit from several relaxed standards under GDPR, including potentially
processing for other compatible purposes pursuant to Art. 6(4)(e) GDPR.”).
352
See supra Part III.C.
353
Bradford et al., supra note 7, at 6.
354
See Ira S. Rubinstein & Woodrow Hartzog, Anonymization and Risk, 91 WASH. L.
REV. 703, 733, 737 (2016) (arguing that anonymization should focus on the process of
minimizing risk of reidentification and sensitive attribute disclosure, not preventing
harm).
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designers can mitigate the risk of de-identification, and in some
jurisdictions they are even obligated to take steps to prevent deidentification.355 As I explained, full anonymity can allow scientists
who research the diffusion of the virus to be absolved from other legal
obligations of data protection laws.356
It should be noted that if the data is only pseudorandomized,
scientists would be subjected to the GDPR but can still benefit from
several relaxed standards in processing under it.357 Scientific research
on COVID-19 aims to benefit society by expanding knowledge on the
spread of the virus. Thus, processing of such information can be lawful
under Article 6 of the GDPR.358
B. Consent, Fiduciary, and Loyalty Duties
Contact tracing surveillance via smartphones should be
voluntary. States must avoid treating all individuals as suspects and
avoid conducting mass surveillance without citizens consenting to it.
“Consent is a fundamental concept in healthcare ethics.”359 It is part
of an individual’s right to self-determination. “It transforms the moral
landscape between people and makes the otherwise impossible
possible,”360 and it allows for solidarity with the community.361 Consent
should be informed and based on information in a “clear and
355
See, e.g., California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), CAL. CIV. CODE §§
1798.140(h)(1)–(4) (2022); KAHN, supra note 8, at 82.
356
See supra notes 340–342 and accompanying text (discussing personal data and
“an identified or identifiable natural person”).
357
Bradford et al., supra note 7, at 7.
358
Article 6 refers to the lawfulness of processing. Article 6(1)(e) can fit well with
scientific research, as it states, “processing is necessary for the performance of a task
carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the
controller.” GDPR art. 6(1)(e). For further information on the lawfulness of
processing and scientific research see Regina Becker et al., COVID-19 Research:
Navigating the European General Data Protection Regulation, 22 J. MED. INTERNET RSCH. 1,
3 (2020) (“As scientific research on COVID-19 aims to benefit society as a whole, using
the legal basis of a task performed in the public interest appears to be a natural choice.
It is also the choice suggested by the EDPB as more appropriate than consent for
research in clinical trials and is one of the potential legal grounds mentioned in the
EDPB’s guidelines on COVID-19 and research. The availability of the public interest
legal basis, however, must be established by Union or Member State law (Article 6).
Infectious disease or public health laws may provide the necessary legal basis as a task
in the public interest.”).
359
See JACQUES TAMIN, OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH ETHICS 25 (2020).
360
Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, The Pathologies of Digital Consent, 96 WASH. U.
L. REV. 1461, 1462 (2019).
361
TAMIN, supra note 359, at 28.
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understandable [language]. Only then can this part of the consenting
process be truly informed consent.”362
Without informed consent to contact tracing via smartphones,
there will be suspicions instead of solidarity. Compulsory measures,
such as the Shin Bet surveillance in Israel,363 crowd out intrinsic
motivation to cooperate with such measures.
Thus, because
surveillance measures were compulsory, many individuals likely left
their smartphones at home.364 Consent is important to promote
solidarity and trust and prevent infringement of civil rights.
Individuals might consent to surveillance in order to protect their
community from possible infection because of social solidarity. An
obligation of receiving consent will also allow app providers and
authorities to keep up with the GDPR requirement of lawful
processing.365
Indeed, in the digital age, practical conditions of informed
consent fall very short of the gold standard of knowing and voluntary
consent.366 Indeed, individuals’ ability to assess the risks of using the
app might be limited.367 Regarding infrequent requests for consent,
however, reaching informed consent might be possible. It could be
easier to imagine harm resulting from consent; noting correct
incentives to choose consciously and seriously, individuals can reach
informed consent.368 The risks of consenting to use the app are clearer
to the user—his decision to consent to the terms of use can be
informed if the consent is limited to contact tracing and the
information is stored only on his smartphone. Consent to a
surveillance app is infrequent and might reduce overload to our
mind’s capacity to make rational choices because individuals usually
upload the app only once.369 If the app is built on privacy-by-design
Id. at 30.
See Bob, supra note 220.
364
See Tamar Uriel Beeri, Doctor: ‘Leave Phone at Home, avoid quarantine’ - Health
Ministry outraged, JERUSALEM POST (July 13,2020) https://www.jpost.com/healthscience/doctor-leave-phone-at-home-avoid-quarantine-health-ministry-outraged634810.
365
For the definition of consent, see GDPR art. 4(11). For consent as one of the
bases of lawful processing, see GDPR art. 6(1)(a).
366
Richards & Hartzog, supra note 360, 1462–63.
367
Citron & Solove, supra note 195, at 852 (explaining that individuals lack the
ability to assess the risks of future harm from the collection, use, and disclosure of their
data).
368
See id. at 1492–98.
369
Id. at 1492–94 (explaining that infrequent consent is more likely to be
informed).
362
363
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and data minimalization, the harm of consenting to surveillance can
be more easily imagined because the information is stored only on the
smartphones of the data subjects and there are less long-term
implications beyond quarantine orders.
Indeed, consent “cannot do everything well all the time.”370 An
individual’s consent to the collection of their information is not always
informed, and they cannot always predict long-term risks.371 This is
especially true if app providers fail to adhere to privacy-by-design
standards, keep the information on their cloud and transfer it to third
parties, and misuse their data in addition to requirements of consent.
Recently, scholars have proposed a concept of information
fiduciaries, inter alia, because of the problems with consent.372 This
approach likens intermediaries’ obligations toward user information
to that of doctors and lawyers’ fiduciary duties to their patients and
clients.373 Accordingly, much like doctors and lawyers’ duties of care,
confidentiality, and loyalty, the law should impose special duties on
intermediaries—such as Facebook, Google, and Twitter—in relation
to their users. Such duties would be “sensitive to the power disparities
within information relationships”374 and solve the problem of gaining
informed consent in the digital age.375 Because such duties focus on
relations, they open the possibility of more robust enforcement rules376
that consider the motives of data collectors.377 Imposing duties of care,

Id. at 1503.
See Hadar Y. Jabotinsky & Michal Lavi, The Eye in the Sky Delivers (and Influences)
What You Buy, 24 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming, 2022), https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3849218.
372
See Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1183, 1186–87 (2016); Jack M. Balkin, Fixing Social Media’s Grand Bargain, in
AEGIS PAPER SERIES 2018 11 (Hoover Inst., Aegis Series Paper No. 1814, 2018); Richards
& Hartzog, A Duty of Loyalty for Privacy Law, supra note 312, 964–65, 988–89; see generally
Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Legislating Data Loyalty, 97 NOTRE DAME L REV.
REFLECTION 356 (2022).
373
See Balkin, Fixing Social Media’s Grand Bargain, supra note 372, at 12.
374
Richards & Hartzog, Legislating Data Loyalty, supra note 372, at 360.
375
Id. at 361 (such duties “allow trusting parties to enter into information
relationships without accepting the risks of whatever harmful data practices and
consequences lurk in the fine print, the business model, or the technology”).
376
Id.
377
Id. at 366 (“Data loyalty would compel an examination of a company’s motives
and the potential adverse consequences to consumers in determining if more data
than necessary was collected or if the use of data deviated too far from its original
purpose.”).
370
371
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fiduciary, and loyalty on app providers will protect users from
manipulative practices and misuses of their data.378
Just as the law imposes special duties of care, confidentiality, and
loyalty on doctors and lawyers with regards to their patients and clients,
it should impose special duties on app providers that collect
information towards their users to act in the best interests of their
digital users and constrain conflicted, self-dealing behavior by
companies.379 App providers resemble fiduciaries because, much like
lawyers and doctors, they receive personal information and are trusted
to treat it with care.380 Thus, app providers should neither breach user
trust nor take actions that users would reasonably consider unexpected
or abusive. Companies should be obligated to be trustworthy
regardless of whether an individual clicked to “agree” to the app’s
terms of service.381 Such policy is currently missing under the existing
U.S. privacy framework. Thus, implementing it would allow for
addressing a broader scope of emergent dangers, including a betrayal
of data collectors.382
Loyalty duties could be implemented on two levels that would
allow for integrating them into practice and enforcing them: First, a
general prohibition on substantial conflicts with the trusting party’s
best interests. Second, specific duties targeting particular actions,383
such as minimization of collection and retention of data, loyal
378
Id. at 363 (“The scope of protection that loyalty rules safeguard includes, but is
broader than, recognized privacy harms like identity theft, emotional harms, breaches
of confidence, and dangerous exposure. It also includes more subtle individual and
collective costs to our identity, our ability to create relationships, our collectively held
truths, and the obscurity that protects our ability to share and move about freely.”).
379
See Jack M. Balkin, The Fiduciary Model of Privacy, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 11, 15
(2020); Richards & Hartzog, A Duty of Loyalty for Privacy Law, supra note 312, at 966–67
(“[A] duty of loyalty framed in terms of the best interests of digital consumers . . .
should become a basic element of U.S. data privacy law. Such a duty of loyalty would
compel loyal acts and also constrain conflicted, self-dealing behavior by companies. It
would shift the default legal presumptions surrounding a number of common design
and data processing practices. It would also act as an interpretive guide for
government actors and data collectors to resolve ambiguities inherent in other privacy
rules.”).
380
In a related context of imposing information fiduciary duty on intermediaries
that profit from their users and beneficiaries, see Jack M. Balkin, The First Amendment
in the Second Gilded Age, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 979, 1006–09 (2018); Balkin, Information
Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, supra note 372, at 1229; Balkin, The Fiduciary Model
of Privacy, supra note 372, at 14–15, 17 (expanding the fiduciary duties to data brokers).
381
See Richards & Hartzog, The Pathologies of Digital Consent, supra note 360, at 1503.
382
Richards& Hartzog, Legislating Data Loyalty, supra note 372, at 364, 369.
383
Id. at 371.
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personalization of data-loyal gatekeeping of third-party access to the
information,384 and restrictions on “malicious interfaces” which are
“meant to influence a person’s behavior against their intentions or best
interests.”385 Such duties could provide clear rules to ensure
accountability. Imposing such duties on app providers is one step
further towards having individual privacy, civil rights, and health.
C. Safeguards: Transparency, Oversight, and Due Process
Even in circumstances when there might be a need for quarantine
orders, such orders that are based on digital infrastructure should be
subject to safeguards. Transparent governance, oversight, and due
process obligations should be fostered to strengthen the protection of
civil rights and liberties.386
1. Transparency
Transparency protects a balance of power between governments
and the public.387 The public has to know what personal data is
collected on them, even in times of crises. They should know how this
data is used and shared, how governments will ensure that it will not
be misused for other purposes beyond combating the virus, and how
long their data will be retained.388 Transparency and disclosure
regarding the nature and scope of surveillance practices and
processing of personal identifying information is only the first step in
preserving civil rights. Transparency obligations towards governments
that use algorithmic decisions should extend to the level of code and
algorithm of automated systems to allow efficient oversight, impact
assessment, and evaluation of automated decisions. Apps should be
based on open-source software, and users should be informed about
the ways in which their personal data is collected, processed, and
stored.389

Id. at 380.
Id. at 382.
386
KAHN, supra note 8, at 3.
387
See Bloch-Wehba, supra note 79, at 923–24.
388
KAHN, supra note 8, at 72.
389
See Press Release, Joint Civil Society, Joint Statement: States Use of Digital
Surveillance Technologies to Fight Pandemic Must Respect Human Rights (Apr. 2,
2020),
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents
/POL3020812020ENGLISH.pdf; Maria Pia Sacco et al., Digital Contact Tracing for the
Covid-19 Epidemic: A Business and Human Rights Perspective, INT’L BAR ASS’N 2, 15–16
(2020), papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3618958.
384
385
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2. Oversight
An open-source approach allows programmers, experts outside
the app, system development teams, and civil society organizations to
review the code. Allowing such oversight can improve the code and
foster trust in contact tracing apps because an open-source approach
enhances trustworthiness.390 Due to the availability of the code for
public review, experts around the world can confirm it works the way
the development team said it would.391
A second oversight safeguard is data protection impact assessment
(DPIA) for processing information that is likely to result in a high risk
to individuals. DPIA evaluates the risk of data processing in the
context that it is processed, including its suitability, necessity, and
appropriateness to succeed in fighting the virus. Processing of
information must be carried out in a transparent, comprehensible way
to the data subject.392 Entities that process private information should
take into account the nature, scope, circumstances, and purposes of
the processing and the risks to individuals’ rights and freedoms. They
should adopt appropriate technical and organizational measures to
ensure and provide proof that the processing is in compliance with
data protection laws.393 The DPIA’s requirement is already anchored
in the GDPR.394
The practice of impact assessment is not revolutionary; it is
starting to gain weight in legislation in other contexts like algorithmic
impact assessment against discrimination and promoting

390
See COVID-19 CONTACT-TRACING MOBILE APPS: EVALUATION AND ASSESSMENT FOR
DECISION MAKERS, COVID SAFE PATHS 11 (2020), https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers
/2006/2006.05812.pdf.
391
See id.; KIRSTEN BOCK ET AL., DATA PROTECTION IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE
CORONA APP 8 (2020) (“Open source development of the server and app software
including all components—for example, in the form of free software—is an essential
prerequisite for transparency regarding the implementation of data protection
principles.”).
392
BOCK ET AL., supra note 391, at 60.
393
Id.
394
Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 35, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU) (“Where a type
of processing in particular using new technologies, and taking into account the nature,
scope, context and purposes of the processing, is likely to result in a high risk to the
rights and freedoms of natural persons, the controller shall, prior to the processing,
carry out an assessment of the impact of the envisaged processing operations on the
protection of personal data. A single assessment may address a set of similar processing
operations that present similar high risks.”); see also Article 29 Data Protection Working
Party 8–13 (Eur. Comm’n, Working Paper No. 248 rev. 01, 2017).
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accountability.395 Such a practice extends beyond the design stage and
requires technology companies to ensure that their algorithms and
tools regularly undergo safety evaluations by independent auditors and
technology experts. Giving engineers an opportunity to correct
failures might mitigate the risk of failure in the design stage or prevent
unexpected reactions of learning algorithms.396 Evaluation tools and
practices of transparency and oversight should be adopted more
broadly, as such tools allow for the discovery of legal violations by
entities that collect information and infringe on civil rights.
3. Due Process for Quarantine Orders
During the outbreak of the virus, in many countries a person
could be ordered to quarantine, despite being alone at the time of the
claimed exposure to the infected person.397 Individuals that are
ordered to quarantine are not criminals, they are just ordinary people
that were more likely to acquire the virus and maybe infect others. By
contrast, however, to criminal procedures that are subjected to
procedural justice and fair trial principles, surveillance technologies
rendered opaque quarantine orders. Citizens lacked an explanation
for decisions made by technologies such as apps, software, and
algorithms. Individuals that received quarantine orders had no

395
Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 2231, 116th Cong. (2019). For
further analysis and criticism, see Margot E. Kaminski & Andrew D. Selbst, The
Legislation That Targets the Racist Impacts of Tech, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/07/opinion/tech-racismalgorithms.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share. For further information on algorithmic
impact assessment, see Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy’s Constitutional
Moment and the Limits of Data Protection, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1687, 1769 (2020) (referring to
algorithmic impact assessment for “high-risk automated decision systems”); Rory Van
Loo, The Missing Regulatory State: Monitoring Businesses in an Age of Surveillance, 75 VAND.
L. REV. 1563, 1602–04 (2019); Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial
Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV. 54, 126 (2019); Frank Pasquale, The Second Wave of
Algorithmic Accountability, L. & POL. ECON. PROJECT (Nov. 25, 2019), bit.ly/2LArsD0.
396
See Michal Lavi, Do Platforms Kill?, 43 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 477, 566 (2020)
(giving an example of a recent bill of impact assessment against algorithmic
discrimination. The proposed bill, the Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019,
“requires entities that use, store, or share personal information to conduct impact
assessments for automated decision systems and data protection. These impact
assessments are meant to monitor for discrimination and give entities a chance to
correct discriminatory algorithms in a timely manner.”); H.R. 2231.
397
See Bob, supra note 220.
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efficient way to appeal,398 and they were deprived of procedural justice
and due process rights that even suspects in crimes are entitled to
under the law.399
In countries such as Israel, where the government ordered
individuals to quarantine based on the conclusion of technological
contact tracing apps, citizens should have been able to contest the
system. Due process facilitates accountability and allows individuals
the opportunity to challenge and contest the decisions that are
delegated to technology. As Professor Citron proposed, there should
be “technological due process.”400 Procedures designed to ensure that
decisions that are delegated to technology and automation satisfy some
standard of review and revision to confirm their fairness and accuracy.
As explained above, transparency that extends to apps, software, and
algorithms allows for more oversight.401 Transparency and oversight
could have made it possible to challenge decisions of quarantine
orders based on contact tracing apps.

398
See, e.g., id. (stating Israel’s “Health Ministry has not merely been inadequately
staffed to field all of the calls from citizens to verify or dispute the text they received”
that order them to be isolated).
399
In Israel, suspects in crimes are entitled to rights of due process and a fair trial
that are protected under the Israeli Human Dignity and Liberty Basic Law. Section 5
to this Basic Law states that “[t]here shall be no deprivation or restriction of the liberty
of a person by imprisonment, arrest, extradition or otherwise.” Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Liberty § 5 (1992) 5752 (Isr.). Section 8 of the law states that “[t]here
shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a Law befitting the values
of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than
is required, or by regulation enacted by virtue of express authorization in such Law.”
Id. § 8. In addition, such rights are guarded in in the Criminal Procedures Act, the
Law of Evidence, and the Penal Law. See Avigdor Feldman, The Right to a Fair Trial In
Israel, http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/fairtrial/wrft-fel.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2022).
Moreover, there are plans to codify these basic rights explicitly in a specific Basic Law.
See Chen Maanit & Netael Bandel, Israel’s Justice Minister Plans Bill Enshrining Suspects’
Rights in Basic Law, HAARETZ (Jul 13, 2021), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news
/2021-07-13/ty-article/.premium/israels-justice-minister-plans-bill-enshriningsuspects-rights-in-basic-law/0000017f-db84-d856-a37f-ffc456980000 (“The law is
expected to include protection of the right of people to approach the courts; the
presumption of innocence until proven guilty in a final judgment; the rights of
detainees; and the principle that punishment cannot be imposed without warning that
someone is committing an offense. It is also expected to include the right to a fair
trial and the state’s duty to respect the rights under the Basic Law.”).
400
Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1249–
50 (2008); see also Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a
Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 121 (2014).
401
See supra Part V.C.1.
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The idea of a right to contest processing of personal information
is not revolutionary; scholars recently proposed the idea in the context
of AI,402 and one can find first signs of it in the EU GDPR. Article 22
of the GDPR addresses automated decision-making and stipulates that
individuals “have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely
on automated processing.”403
Article 22(3), which addresses
safeguards against automated decision-making, directs that: “the data
controller shall implement suitable measures to safeguard the data
subject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate interests, at least the right
to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller, to express
his or her point of view and to contest the decision.”404
Transparency and oversight of technology are not enough.
Individuals should have had a right to appeal and contest the
quarantine that denied their freedom without due process based on
an automated decision. “The right of appeal . . . is a fundamental
element of procedural fairness as generally understood in [the United
States],”405 as well as in other countries.406 Similar to appeal rights in
courts, individuals should have appeal rights when they are subjected
to decisions of automated systems.407 As there were a lot of false
positive quarantine orders that coerced people to stay at home,408
individuals should have at least been able to present an alibi proving
402
Margot E. Kaminski & Jennifer M. Urban, The Right to Contest AI, 121 COLUM. L.
REV. 1957, 1957 (2021).
403
Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 22, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 46 (EU). This
prohibition applies only when the decision is “based solely” on algorithmic decisionmaking without a human in the loop. Once the process is not “solely” automated, this
provision will not apply. See Meg Leta Jones, Right to a Human in the Loop: Political
Constructions of Computer Automation & Personhood from Data Banks to Algorithms, 47 SOC.
STUD. SCI. 216, 217 (2017); Tal Z. Zarsky, Incompatible: The GDPR in the Age of Big Data,
47 SETON HALL L. REV. 995, 1015–16 (2017); Margot E. Kaminski, The Right to
Explanation, Explained, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 189, 190–91 (2019).
404
GDPR art. 22(3).
405
Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE
L.J. 62, 66 (1985) (quoting ABA COMM. ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION:
STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.10 commentary, at 12 (1977)).
406
On fair trial in Israel, see supra note 399.
407
In a related context, see Margot E. Kaminski & Jennifer M. Urban, The Right to
Consent AI, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 1957, 1979 (2021) (referring to Article 22 of the GDPR
which focuses on automated individual decisions, “[t]he GDPR’s new wording
compared to the Directive’s ‘points at . . . at least, an obligation to hear the merits of
the appeal and to provide a justification for the decision.’ This right ‘obliges the data
controller either to render automated decisions contestable or to cease [automated
decision-making] at all.’”).
408
See Greenbaum, supra note 225.
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their presence at home at the time of the claimed exposure. For
instance, a government could allow people to present an affidavit from
someone that had been at home with them. Alternatively, individuals
could contest the conclusion of the contact tracing app through
technological means, such as recordings from personal digital
assistants that can contest the conclusion of the contact tracing app,409
or CCTV outside their homes. Effective due process and the right to
contest and appeal is likely to mitigate violations of human rights and
civil liberties.
D. Categories of States’ Data-driven Surveillance that Should Be
Forbidden: The Case of Risk Score
The previous subsections explain that when COVID-19’s risks
were largely unknown, some steps may have been necessary to combat
it. But the way of implementing them could have made a difference.
Governments should have avoided certain steps at all costs, such
as utilizing either the notorious cyber intelligence company NSO’s risk
score system for handling information about the probability of
infection depending on an individuals’ network,410 or the Chinese
system of AI risk score.411 Such systems moralize and normalize the
social classification of people, causing injustice and inequality.412
These systems involve constant surveillance of individuals and their
network’s movements, calculating many dimensions and contexts of
everyday lives. Individuals cannot knowingly consent to such constant,
frequent, and invasive surveillance.413 Governments implementing
such systems would normalize constant surveillance and promote the
rise of the surveillance state.
A system of risk scoring, which depends on many parameters
processed and scored algorithmically in the black box,414 is less likely

409
Amazon Alexa is an example of a personal digital assistant. See CLEMENS KRUEGER
& SEAN MCKEOWN, IEEE INT’L CONF. ON CYBER INCIDENT RESPONSE, COORDINATION,
CONTAINMENT & CONTROL, USING AMAZON ALEXA APIS AS A SOURCE OF DIGITAL EVIDENCE
(2020), https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/2006/2006.08749.pdf.
410
Ackerman & Benmeleh, supra note 163.
411
See Huang et al., supra note 167 and accompanying text.
412
KATE CRAWFORD, ATLAS OF AI 205–06 (2021) (criticizing the use of systems that
were designed to combat terrorism for social credit scoring based on correlations, not
on inherent precision).
413
See Richards & Hartzog, The Pathologies of Digital Consent, supra note 360, at 1464
(expanding on the inefficiency of consent in cases of frequent surveillance and
invasions of privacy).
414
See generally PASQUALE: THE BLACK BOX, supra note 183.
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to achieve sufficient transparency. Moreover, the system designers
might avoid being transparent with the algorithm, out of concern for
trade secrets.415 Therefore, there are legal difficulties in imposing
general transparency obligations that allow for public oversight.416 In
addition, system designers are likely to be disincentivized from
revealing the parameters beyond the scoring systems. This is because
declining to reveal the parameters beyond the system will reduce
individuals’ ability to artificially change their behavior, or alternatively,
game the algorithm in other ways to prevent an increase in their risk
scores.417 Further, even with transparency regarding the parameters at
the base of the algorithm, and an impact assessment being conducted,
it would be difficult to achieve efficient public oversight and mitigate
the biases of the system, as it depends on AI and learning algorithms.418
Because AI systems learn to recognize patterns and similarities, their
capabilities grow in evolving and continuing processes as they absorb
more data.419 Furthermore, oversight might not be entirely feasible
when learning algorithms are involved in creating and updating risk

415
See Dennis D. Hirsch, From Individual Control to Social Protection: New Paradigms for
Privacy Law in the Age of Predictive Analytics, 79 MD. L. REV. 439, 481 (2020); Finale DoshiVelez & Mason Kortz, Accountability of AI Under the Law: The Role of Explanation 2
(Berkman Klein Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y, Working Paper, 2017),
https://dash.harvard.edu /handle/1/34372584 (explaining that “there exist
concerns that the engineering challenges surrounding explanation from AI systems
would stifle innovation; that explanations might force trade secrets to be revealed”).
416
See Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1503, 1540 (2013);
Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Access to Algorithms, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1308 (2020)
(“Faced with demands for more transparency, courts and litigants have sometimes
reached an apparent compromise: protective orders, coupled with nondisclosure
orders, that permit disclosure to the parties while preventing disclosure to the general
public.”).
417
See Jane Bambauer & Tal Zarsky, The Algorithm Game, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1,
4–5 (2018) (“The algorithm game also has important yet unintuitive distributional
consequences. Some populations will be less willing or able to engage in gaming, and
therefore both gaming and countermoves can have disparate effects on different
subgroups.”).
418
AI systems can produce biased outcomes that can inflict harm to minorities. For
example, Amazon’s AI facial recognition software wrongly identified twenty-eight
members of Congress as individuals who had jail mugshots. Jacob Snow, Amazon’s Face
Recognition Falsely Matched 28 Members of Congress with Mugshots, ACLU (July 26, 2018,
8:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/amazons-face-recognitionfalsely-matched-28.
419
See Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Black Box Tinkering: Beyond Disclosure in
Algorithmic Enforcement, 69 FLA. L. REV. 181, 189–90 (2017).
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scores because the systems are capable of “learning” and changing.420
Finally, such automated agents lack legitimacy, thereby throwing away
the expertise that justifies the administrative state.421 Lack of
significant oversight over automated decisions denies individuals their
constitutional right to due process422 and their right to appeal423
decisions that have substantial effects on their civil rights.
Beyond infringing on privacy itself, social risk scores can exclude
individuals with a high-risk score from society and deny them benefits.
Social risk scores can also lead to their stigmatization because other
people in these individuals’ networks would want to avoid adverse
effects on their scores. A scoring system that combats the virus can also
creep and lead to the creation of other unrelated scores.424 For
instance, an obesity score used as a proxy for health could lead to other
forms of discrimination that might relate directly to protected
categories.
Continuing mass surveillance for creating a risk score, which can
change with an individual’s each and every action, normalizes
surveillance.425 Moreover, constant surveillance violates intellectual
privacy.426 “When the same powerful capacities are ranking and rating
everyone all the time, they become oppressive.”427 These powerful
capacities can also chill free speech.428 As a result of constant
surveillance, individuals will chill themselves, avoid asking questions,
doubt facts, and refrain from looking for innovative answers to
problems. Individuals might avoid experimenting with ideas, and thus
constant surveillance hampers their freedom of expression.

ADAM THIERER, ANDREA CASTILLO O’SULLIVAN & RAYMOND RUSSELL, ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY, 19–20 (2017).
421
See Ryan Calo & Danielle Keats Citron, The Automated Administrative State: A Crisis
of Legitimacy, 70 EMORY L.J. 797 (2021) (explaining that reliance on automation and
technology raise problems for the constitutional right of due process and due process
problems of legitimacy for agencies that automate, thereby throwing away the
expertise that justifies the administrative state).
422
Citron & Pasquale, The Scored Society, supra note 230.
423
On this right, see supra Part V.C.
424
On censorship creep, see Tokson & Waldman, supra note 23.
425
See Harari, The World After Coronavirus, supra note 6.
426
On intellectual privacy and its connection to freedom of expression, see
RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY, supra note 189.
427
See FRANK PASQUALE, NEW LAWS OF ROBOTICS: DEFENDING HUMAN EXPERTISE IN THE
AGE OF AI 11 (2020).
428
See supra Part IV.B.1.ii.
420
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The deciding factors in avoiding risk scores altogether are the
erosion of basic freedoms429 and democracy, as well as the rise of the
surveillance state.430 Governments can misuse risk scores, which it
assigns to each and every citizen to combat the virus, for other
purposes unrelated to the public’s health. The risk score system in
itself creates an infrastructure for collecting information on citizens.
Governments can use risk scores to gain control over citizens by
punishing behavior that does not fit with the standards the
government sets,431 entrench governance, and eliminate democracy
due to the opacity of the risk score system, lack of oversight, and lack
of due process. For example, governments will have information on
individuals that oppose the regime.432 Governments can use the
information to oppress protest and opposition to the regime433 and
justify this oppression on protest and free speech by assigning a highrisk score that does not allow protesters to demonstrate.434 Constant
surveillance allows governments to move beyond transparent
limitations on opposition. Such information allows governments to
know who opposes them, thus enabling governments to disrupt the
communication and voices of such activists without providing any
justification. For example, governments—using bots to enhance their
Stacy Rudin, Will You Choose Freedom?, AIER (Sept. 1, 2020), https://www.aier.org
/article/will-you-choose-freedom (describing freedom as giving up grasping control).
430
In a related context of the Chinese system, see Lauren Yu-Hsin Lin & Curtis J.
Milhaupt, China’s Corporate Social Credit System and the Dawn of Surveillance State
Capitalism, (Stanford Law School, Working Paper No. 560, 2021), https://ssrn.com
/abstract=3933134 (“Chinese state capitalism is transitioning toward a panoptic,
technology-assisted variant that we call ‘surveillance state capitalism.’ The mechanism
driving the emergence of this variant is China’s corporate social credit system (CSCS)–
–a big data project to evaluate the ‘trustworthiness’ of all business entities registered
in the country.”).
431
For an example of the use of the social scoring system in China, see Lydia
Barrios, Origins and Perceptions of the Chinese Social Credit System 5 (2020)
(Honors Thesis, Duke University), https://sites.duke.edu/honorsthesis2020/files
/2020/04/Final-FINAL-Draft-Lydia-Barrios.pdf (“Under the national SCS, the
Chinese government will be scrutinizing citizens and closely monitoring their
behaviors to calculate a social score. This score will be used as part of a rewards and
punishments scheme that aims to control citizens' behavior to fit the standards set by
the CCP.”).
432
See, e.g., RICHARDS, supra note 30, at 145–153 (expanding on the ability of the
NSA to collect information on citizens and gain power by using the information to
blackmail or persuade citizens).
433
See Reports: Chinese Authorities Using COVID-Tracking App to Thwart Protesters, CHINA
NEWS (June 15, 2022), https://www.voanews.com/a/reports-chinese-authoritiesusing-covid-tracking-app-to-thwart-protesters-/6619689.html.
434
See Friedman, supra note 33, at 15.
429
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attacks—can disrupt protestors’ internet infrastructure, thus
preventing them from organizing. Governments can also post
disinformation and conduct organized disruptions to opposition
activity. Such algorithmic software programs, which operate according
to instructions, can interact socially with users and manipulate the
audience into distrusting activists that oppose the regime.435
Moreover, such mass attacks can include “doxing,” meaning it can
include publishing personal details of individuals online, such as home
address, work details, phone number, details on their parents,
children, and more, thereby even creating a potential for physical
violence against opponents to the government.436 Mass attacks can
silence protestors and chill their speech, thereby preventing criticism
of government officials.437
Governments can use the infrastructure of the risk scoring system
to gain control over citizens in non-transparent ways. The system can
use the vast information it gathers to manipulate citizens towards the
government’s desired purposes. The government, having knowledge
on individuals, holds the power to influence their behavior and lead
them to act in certain ways. Modern technology in smart devices—
coupled with the computational power used to decode “big data” and
the ability to direct messages and advertisements back to a specific
individual—can manipulate individuals’ behavior.438 Technologies

435
Emilio Ferrara et al., The Rise of Social Bots, 59 COMMC’NS ACM 96, 96 (2016)
(defining a social bot as “a computer algorithm that automatically produces content
and interacts with humans on social media, trying to emulate and possibly alter their
behavior”); WALDMAN, supra note 176, at 141 (expanding on the social communication
of bots that motivate people to waive privacy protections, as a result of technological
design); JARON LANIRE, TEN ARGUMENTS FOR DELETING YOUR SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS
RIGHT NOW 55 (2018) (“If your extended peer group contains a lot of fake people
calculated to manipulate you, you are likely to be influenced without even realizing
it.”).
436
See generally Ido Kilovaty, Doxfare: Politically Motivated Leaks and the Future of the
Norm on Non-Intervention in the Era of Weaponized Information, 9 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 146,
149 (2018) (on doxing generally).
437
See generally Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, The Internet as a Speech
Machine and Other Myths Confounding Section 230 Reform, 2020 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 45, 55
(2020) (explaining that attacks online can silence individuals).
438
See YUVAL NOAH HARARI, 21 LESSONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 267–68 (2018) (“You
might have heard that we are living in the era of hacking computers, but that’s hardly
half the truth. In fact, we live in the era of hacking humans. The algorithms are
watching you right now. They are watching where you go, what you buy, who you meet.
Soon they will monitor all your steps. All your breaths, all your heartbeats. They are
relying on Big Data and machine learning to get to know you better and once these
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can also process patterns of individual behavior. An analysis of the
“Likes” that individuals hit on Facebook (Meta), which was conducted
to evaluate risk scores, provides the government with an accurate
evaluation on a wide range of personality traits, emotional states,439 or
psychographic traits,440 even if individuals never meant to share that
Cambridge-Analytica’s model for
information with anyone.441
predicting behavior of voters and targeting political messages442 is one
prominent example of how data on voters can be used to manipulate
votes and erode democracy. The more data a government collects, the
more powerful its ability to manipulate citizens to advocate for a
certain government policy, or vote for a specific political candidate,
thereby entrenching the regime.
As explained above, a privacy-by-design approach, transparency,
impact assessment, and due process could mitigate part of the concern
regarding violations of civil rights in the struggle to combat the spread
of the virus. But such measures are not likely to mitigate the
prospective damage of risk scores; as such, surveillance is constant and
includes every aspect of life. Using constant surveillance in the
practice of risk scores for combating viruses that involves constant
surveillance is unacceptable—it should be ruled out altogether and
prevented at all costs. Otherwise, the United States, and any country
that chooses to adopt risk scores, will become like the surveillance state
and the Orwellian dystopia described in the novel 1984.443

algorithms know you better than you know yourself, they could control and
manipulate you and you won’t be able to do much about it.”).
439
See Michal Kosinski et al., Private Traits and Attributes are Predictable from Digital
Records of Human Behavior, 110 PNAS 5802, 5805 (Apr. 9, 2013), https://www.pnas.org
/doi/full/10.1073/pnas.1218772110; Wu Youyou et al., Computer-Based Personality
Judgments are More Accurate Than Those Made by Humans, 112 PNAS 1036 (Jan. 27, 2015),
https://www.pnas.org/doi/full/10.1073/pnas.1418680112.
440
See Hannes Grassegger & Mikael Krogerus, The Data That Turned the World Upside
Down, MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 28, 2017), https://www.vice.com/en/article/mg9vvn
/how-our-likes-helped-trump-win; see also Terrell McSweeny, Psychographics, Predictive
Analytics, Artificial Intelligence, & Bots: Is the FTC Keeping Pace?, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 514,
514 (2018).
441
See Gregory Park et al., Automatic Personality Assessment Through Social Media
Language, 108 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH., 934, 934 (2015).
442
See Carole Cadwalladr & Emma Graham-Harrison, Revealed: 50 Million Facebook
Profiles Harvested for Cambridge Analytica in Major Data Breach, GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebookinfluence-us-election.
443
See generally ORWELL, supra note 282.
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VI. CONCLUSION
“Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little
temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.” 444
Given the uncertainty regarding the scope of risk and
consequences of COVID-19, at the beginning of the outbreak of the
virus, governments and private companies developed data-driven mass
surveillance practices to combat the spread. Governments and private
companies used such tools to track contacts with infected people and
warn of exposure, enforce quarantine orders, identify and predict
areas of urban outbreak to conduct social network analyses, and even
to assign risk scores to citizens.
Much like the KGB, digital mass surveillance tracks individuals.
But, with technological surveillance, there is no need for human
agents: “Governments can rely on ubiquitous sensors and powerful
algorithms,”445 thereby infringing on civil rights and liberties without
sufficient safeguards, eroding democracy, creeping beyond the health
context, and leading to the surveillance state.
This Article first overviewed types of practices that were used
during the COVID-19 outbreak. Next, it warned of the flip side of
using such mass surveillance practices, including their infringement
on human rights and civil liberties, the erosion of democracy in itself,
and the creep of such practices into other contexts. The Article argued
that the public should not allow infringements of their rights and the
erosion of democracy, even in times of crisis. The public should not
have to choose between civil rights and health; rather, the public
should have both. Adopting the privacy-by-design approach and
safeguards would have benefitted the public. Finally, this Article
referred to the types of surveillance that should be ruled out at all costs.
This Article focused on a test case of surveillance. This example
is, however, only one of many ways in which governments use crises to
infringe on human rights and civil liberties. When COVID-19 started
to spread, there might have been uncertainty regarding the scope of
the virus’s danger. Governments compromised civil rights and
liberties for the sake of public health by instituting mass surveillance,
quarantine orders, and even planning to apply risk scoring.
444
Letter from Benjamin Franklin, to Robert Hunter Morris, Governor of
Pennsylvania (Nov. 11, 1755), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin
/01-06-020107#:~:text=Those%20who%20would%20give%20up,deserve%20neither%20Libert
y%20nor%20Safety.
445
Harari, The World After Coronavirus, supra note 6.
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Many countries even imposed a “Green Passport” system order to
encourage citizens to get vaccinated. “Green Passports,” beyond
causing people to make decisions related to their health for the wrong
reasons,446 had other potential uses: the government could have used
them as a surveillance tool because the system was installed as a
smartphone app or could have used them to create a general “credit
score.”447
The government brutally imposed aggressive steps and mandates
on citizens without transparency. The recent leak of Anthony Fauci’s
emails reveals that in the United States some of the steps taken were
inefficient, and the government should have known that from the
beginning.448 This demonstrates that without transparency and
Simone M. Matthews, Israel – Human Tragedy – Part 1, SIMONE MATTHEWS,
https://www.universallifetools.com/2021/03/israel-human-tragedy-is-this-the-globaltemplate (last visited Oct. 11, 2022). I would like to note that I never believed that
such limitations, that are beyond soft paternalism and exceed to coercion, would arrive
in the United States. I thought that because of the deep commitment to constitutional
values and autonomy, the United States would have adopted a policy of “your health
is your responsibility,” as adopted by some businesses. See, e.g., @bluestarrfl, TWITTER
(Dec.
11,
2021,
10:08
PM),
https://twitter.com/bluestarrfl/status
/1469866707376345097. But surprisingly, the Green Pass was applied in the United
States. Stefania Milan et.al., Promises Made to Be Broken: Performance and Performativity in
Digital Vaccine and Immunity Certification,12 EUR. J. RISK REG. 382, 383 (2021) (“This
move mirrors other initiatives around the world to certify, at the very least, receipt of
an authorised COVID-19 vaccine. These include Israel, whose ‘Green Pass’ was
deployed in early 2022; Hungary and Iceland; and proposals in the UK and the USA.”)
(emphasis added). Moreover, President Joe Biden announced new mandates on
workers in the United States. Twenty-six states filed suits against Biden’s vaccine
mandate. In response, the Biden Administration repealed federal vaccine mandates,
a federal court in Missouri suspended the vaccine mandate for United States health
workers, and a federal judge sided with Attorney General Wilson by blocking the Biden
Administration’s vaccine requirement for federal contractors. See Federal Judge Sides
with S.C., Other States, Blocks Vaccine Mandate for Federal Contract Workers, WMBF NEWS
(Dec. 7, 2021), https://www.wmbfnews.com/2021/12/07/federal-judge-sides-with-scother-states-blocks-vaccine-mandate-federal-contract-workers.
447
Former Prime Minister Bennett talks about the “credit score” tech system that
developed in Israel. This system was rolled out in Israel as the “new” vaccine pass
system as of October 3, 2021. @efenigson, TWITTER (Sept. 28, 2021, 6:31 AM),
https://twitter.com/efenigson/status/1442799033932816384; Elizabeth M. Renieris,
What’s Really at Stake with Vaccine Passports, CIGI (Apr. 5, 2021),
https://www.cigionline.org/articles/whats-really-stake-vaccine-passports.
448
Dr. Anthony Fauci, the Chief Medical Advisor to the President and the Director
of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, knew that some mandates
were inefficient, but he continued advocating for them. See Darragh Roche, Fauci Said
Masks ‘Not Really Effective in Keeping Out Virus,’ Email Reveals, NEWSWEEK (June 2, 2021,
4:59 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/fauci-said-masks-not-really-effective-keepingout-virus-email-reveals-1596703 (reporting that a leak of Fauci's emails shows that some
446
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oversight, and with only partial constitutional protection due to
“exigent circumstances,” the government’s ability to compromise
human rights and civil liberties can be arbitrary.
Beyond the direct context of surveillance, living under emergency
regulations also led to the general erosion of human rights, civil
liberties, and, in particular, freedom of expression. This era
legitimized the censorship of people that did not agree with
infringement of human rights or civil liberties and enabled certain
governmental bodies to block access to knowledge. For example,
individuals expressed legitimate criticism on the policy of the Israeli
Ministry of Health,449 a public governmental authority. Despite being
a governmental authority, the Ministry of Health blocked people who
criticized its policy from accessing its Twitter account, thereby
infringing upon the people’s constitutional right to free speech,450
including their right to receive information.451 Censorship was
pervasive in the private sector as well. Platforms relied solely on
automated moderation at the beginning of the virus outbreak.452 As a
were “not really effective in keeping out the [sic] virus, which is small enough to pass
through material”). Despite this, Dr. Fauci continued to advocate mandating masks
for everyone. See also Nicholas Jensen, Bombshell Emails Over What Anthony Fauci Knew,
AUSTRALIAN (June 3, 2021, 6:30 PM), https://www.theaustralian.com.au/subscribe
/news/1/?sourceCode=TAWEB_WRE170
_a&dest=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theaustralian.com.au%2Fscience%2Fbombshellemails-over-what-anthony-fauci-knew%2Fnewsstory%2F39c108c393a660b85dce452e4eb4a6b3&memtype=anonymous&mode=prem
ium&v21=dynamic-groupb-control-noscore&V21spcbehaviour=append.
449
The conduct of The Israeli Ministry of Health was controversial. For further
information, see Guy Shinar, How the Israeli Ministry of Health Became an Agent for Pfizer,
BROWNSTONE INST. (Oct. 18, 2022), https://brownstone.org/articles/how-the-israeliministry-of-health-became-an-agent-for-pfizer.
450
The right to free speech is a basic right in Israel and is protected under the
Human Dignity and Liberty Basic Law. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty
Amendments of 1994, SH 90; see, e.g Toy Staff, Mandelblit Says Elected Officials Cannot
Block Citizens on Social Media, TIMES ISR. (Feb 2, 2022), https://www.timesofisrael.com
/mandelblit-says-elected-officials-cannot-block-citizens-on-social-media.
451
See Mordechai Sones, Israel Health Ministry Blocks Dissenting Citizens on Twitter;
Legal Experts: ‘Definitely Illegal’, AM.’S FRONTLINE DRS. (June 27,2021),
https://www.globalresearch.ca/israel-health-ministry-blocks-dissenting-citizenstwitter-legal-experts-definitely-illegal/5749333?pdf=5749333 (Children’s medical
rights advocate Dr. Avshalom Carmel wrote: “The Ministry of Health is blocking
citizens who criticize it? That’s called McCarthyism, isn’t it? Is it Corona fascism, or
just the misuse of high-tech knowledge by an unknown programmer?”).
452
See, e.g., Kang-Xing Jin, Keeping Our People and Informed About the Coronavirus,
META (Dec. 18, 2020), https://about.fb.com/news/2020/12/coronavirus/#keepingour-teams-safe; Vijaya Gadde & Matt Derella, An Update on Our Continuity Strategy During
COVID-19, TWITTER BLOG, (Mar. 16, 2020), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics
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result, these platforms mistakenly removed, blocked access to, or made
it difficult to share, high-quality content.453 These practices applied
even when the content was research that was published in one of the
world’s oldest and most influential general medical journals: the
scientific BMJ.454 The harm done to human rights and civil liberties
will be difficult to fix, and such infringements can creep beyond the
context of emergencies.
At this time (October 2022), when almost all COVID-19
restrictions have been lifted, we realize that many of the steps taken to
combat the virus were misguided and caused more harm than good.455
Even under a different scenario in which such steps might have been
required, both implementing a privacy-by-design approach and
safeguards, and forbidding the most dangerous and intrusive practices
of surveillance are necessary to prevent the rise of the surveillance
state. Liberal democracy is not a given, it is something we have to fight
for every day.456
***
I would like to conclude with a personal take on the general topic
of human rights, civil liberties, and health in general. About two years
ago, my mother––Aviva Lavi—died. Her death was sudden and
unexpected. She did not die due to the virus, but rather because of the
lockdowns, the government’s restrictions, and the idea that
prioritization of curbing the spread of the virus over any other medical
problem. If human rights and civil liberties were preserved, she
probably would have still been living happily with us. Due to the
/company/2020/An-update-on-our-continuitystrategy-during-COVID-19.html (last
updated Apr. 1, 2020).
453
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aggressive lockdown in Israel between March and May, people were
not allowed to travel beyond 0.06 (100M) miles from their homes.457
Police officers were finding those that were just wanting to breathe
outside air.458 Moreover, everything was closed, and there was nowhere
to go. Therefore, my mother barely came out of the house and did not
walk much. My mother was not very afraid of the virus and would
otherwise go out—not to crowded places, but she definitely would not
have stayed at home.
After the first lockdown, something went wrong because of her
lack of activity, and she started falling without a reason. So, we went to
orthopedic doctors and neurologists, but they could not find the
problem. Her Computed Tomography (CT) scan turned out fine, and
we had appointments for Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) tests
and other medical tests, but she broke her foot before these
appointments could happen. At the hospital, they did not bother to
carry out any medical tests, even after asking them to do so, and
disclaimed responsibility, even though they had the medical
equipment to carry out the tests and find the reason why she was
falling. But, they conducted four COVID-19 tests that turned out
negative, as if COVID-19 was the only medical problem that existed.
After a week or so, they sent her to a medical rehabilitation hospital,
but there the staff also neglected to treat her properly. At the
rehabilitation hospital, she received few physiotherapy sessions
because they were understaffed due to quarantine. Moreover, due to
the COVID-19 restrictions, they allowed only one family member to
visit her for only one hour per day. When she arrived at the
rehabilitation hospital, she was aided by a walker. When she came
home, about a month later, she needed a wheelchair. We invited a
private physiotherapist to our home and, after checking on my mother,
he told us that she was likely to walk again with proper care. A day
later, however, she suddenly had a heart failure and died. She was only
457
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seventy-five years old and had no other medical problems. I have no
doubt that her heart failure was connected to the lack of treatment and
a feeling of helplessness.
The health system neglected many other people that were not
even infected by the virus, but had other medical issues. Others
without medical problems also became ill. Elderly people cognitively
deteriorated at nursing homes during the lockdowns because family
members, who would have otherwise visited, were restricted from
visiting and frontally communicating with them.459
The Israeli government, as well as other governments that took
similar steps, by depriving citizens of their human rights and civil
liberties and prioritizing COVID-19 over everything else, caused
tremendous harm, not only to democracy but also to individuals’
health. Such an infringement on rights and liberties has cost the life
of my dearest of all.
I dedicate this Article to the memory of my mother—Aviva Lavi—
who will always be remembered, loved, and dearly missed.
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